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The Prostitution of Lying in Wait
H. MITCHELL CALDWELL*
Kurt Michaels planned and executed the murder of JoAnn Clem-
ons.' He and an accomplice waited at a construction site adjacent to
some apartments where they could view the victim's third-story win-
dow.2 After several hours, the light in the victim's apartment went out
and the two set off across the parking lot, walked up the stairwell and,
using a key supplied by the victim's daughter, entered the apartment.'
The victim called out, "Who is it?" Michaels and his cohort entered her
bedroom, struggled with the victim and killed her.4
The San Diego District Attorney capitally charged Michaels,5 alleg-
ing as one of the death qualifying circumstances that Michaels murdered
while "lying in wait."6 Specifically, the District Attorney would have
had to allege that Michaels's actions involved (1) a "concealment of
purpose, [(]2) a substantial period of watching and waiting for an oppor-
tune time to act, and (3) immediately thereafter, a surprise attack on an
unsuspecting victim from a position of advantage . . .,
Murder by lying in wait is a particularly vile manner of murder.8
Concealing oneself in the backseat of a car and then attacking the driver
when he enters is lying in wait. Hiding behind an embankment and
* Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law, co-author of THE ART AND
SCIENCE OF TRIAL ADVOCACY (2002) and LADIES AND GENTLEMEN OF THE JURY (1998). The
author is indebted to law student Joshua Stambaugh for his excellent research assistance and for
his inspired dedication to this project. The author is also grateful to Pepperdine University School
of Law for its funding of the article through summer research grants.
I. See People v. Michaels, 49 P.3d 1032, 1040-42 (Cal. 2002).
2. See id. at 1041.
3. Id.
4. See Brief for Respondent at 13-16, People v. Michaels, 49 P.3d 1032 (Cal. 2002) (No.
16924).
5. See Michaels, 49 P.3d at 1040.
6. Id. Three other special circumstances were charged in conjunction with Count t: that the
murder was carried out for financial gain (in violation of section 190.2(a)(11) of the California
Penal Code), that the murder was committed during the commission or attempted commission of a
robbery (in violation of section 190.2 (a)(17)(i) of the California Penal Code), and that the murder
was committed in the commission of a burglary (in violation of section 190.2 (a)(17)(viii) of the
California Penal Code). Id. In addition to Count 1, Michaels was also charged with robbery and
burglary. Id. The jury convicted Michaels on all three counts, and found all allegations and
special circumstances to be true. Id.
7. People v. Morales, 770 P.2d 244, 260-61 (Cal. 1989) (defining the necessary elements of
California's lying in wait special circumstance as codified in section 190.2 (a)(15) of the
California Penal Code).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 35-39.
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shooting the victim as he walks by is lying in wait. Calling for a pizza
delivery and then shooting the driver as he steps to the door is lying in
wait.9 Each act is the culmination not only of planning and premedita-
tion,"° but also of preying on an unsuspecting victim from a position of
overwhelming advantage. 1 Did Kurt Michaels lie in wait? Did he
spring forth from concealment and immediately ambush an unsuspecting
victim? Was his conduct when he left his place of concealment, walked
across a parking lot, climbed some stairs, entered the apartment and then
the bedroom, lying in wait? Can it be that he was lying in wait when he
entered through the victim's front door?
9. See People v. Sims, 853 P.2d 992, 997-99 (Cal. 1993).
10. See, e.g., People v. Sanchez, 24 Cal. 17, 28-29 (1864):
In order to constitute murder in the first degree there must be something more than
malicious or intentional killing .... There must be killing by means of poison, lying
in wait, or torture, or some other kind of killing different from that of poison, lying
in wait or torture, which is wilful, deliberate, and premeditated; or a killing which is
committed in the perpetration or the attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery,
or burglary.
See also State v. Baldwin, 12 P. 318, 328 (Kan. 1886) ("The act described, and, in fact, any
murder committed by means of poison, as well as by lying in wait, involves and presupposes the
elements of malice, premeditation, and deliberation; and hence it was needless for the court to
state that they were prerequisites to a conviction."); State v. Daniels, 46 S.E. 991, 993 (N.C.
1904):
It will be observed that the statute classifies murder in the first degree: (1) By
poisoning, lying in wait, etc. Herein the state is not required to prove premeditation,
because the manner of doing the act necessarily involves premeditation. The
presumption is made, by the statute, irrebuttable. When committed in either of the
methods mentioned, it is per se murder in the first degree. A person who lays poison
for or waylays or tortures another unto death will not be heard to say that he did not
premeditate.
See also State v. Morgan, 61 P. 527, 530 (Utah 1887) ("So the act of homicide by poison or lying
in wait carries with it conclusive evidence of premeditation; and a jury ha[s] no option but to find
the prisoner guilty in the first degree, upon proof of the crime."). In California, jury instructions
stating that lying in wait necessarily implies premeditation or deliberation were found erroneous in
People v. Valentine, 169 P.2d I (Cal. 1946). Instead, the Valentine court stated that these killings
are murders of the first degree because "of the substantive statutory definition of the crime." Id. at
10. Therefore, California has now conclusively established that murder by lying in wait is the
equivalent of premeditation or deliberation, and the prosecutor need not prove both. See People v.
Byrd, 266 P.2d 505, 509 (Cal. 1954) ("If the killing was committed by lying-in-wait, it was
murder of the first degree by force of the statute and the question of premeditation was not further
involved.") (citations omitted); see also Garth A. Osterman & Colleen Wilcox Heidenreich, Lying
in Wait: A General Circumstance, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 1249, 1258 n.74 (explaining that the special
circumstance of lying in wait may be flawed because it possibly encompasses more types of
murder than ordinary premeditated and deliberated first degree murder). Despite this new
development in Byrd, and the fact that California now sees a murder committed by lying in wait to
be first degree murder as a matter of law, and not because it shows evidence of premeditation,
other sources in this footnote have found overwhelming evidence of the presence of deliberation
or premeditation in a murder by lying in wait, thereby qualifying it as a legitimate form of first
degree murder.
11. See infra notes 88-89.
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The prosecutor's filing of a lying in wait special circumstance, 12 the
jury's finding that Michaels did in fact lie in wait, 3 and the California
Supreme Court's blessing of that finding14 raise troubling questions.
Has the lying in wait death qualifying circumstance come to be so
broadly defined that it has lost its distinctiveness as a legitimate narrow-
ing mechanism for singling out those deserving of capital punishment? 5
Has this particular "aggravating" or "special" circumstance been
expanded beyond the United States Supreme Court's mandate as set
forth in Furman v. Georgia, that any death penalty law must necessarily
narrow that class of individuals deserving execution?' 6
The United States Supreme Court has instructed that the purpose of
a death penalty scheme is to ferret out those who deserve to die from
those who do not."' God knows there is an abundance of murderers
such as Kurt Michaels in this country,' 8 but which of these are to be
singled out and executed, and which are to be spared? Surely factors
such as race, ethnicity, economic status, religion, and sex must be elimi-
nated from consideration,' 9 and yet as a nation we have woefully failed
to weed out those very factors in determining who is to be executed.2 °
In fact, the one constant of the American death penalty is its very arbi-
trariness. 2' The death penalty schemes of the thirty-seven capital pun-
ishment states, as well as the federal death statute, are so fraught with
generalities that arbitrariness thrives among their many nuances. 2
How else are we to explain that the Los Angeles District Attorney
12. See People v. Michaels, 49 P.3d 1032, 1040 (Cal. 2002).
13. Id.
14. See id. at 1049-50.
15. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 249-51 (1972).
16. Id.; see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (noting that the primary holding
of Furman was the unconstitutionality of arbitrary and capricious administration of the death
penalty).
17. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 256 (Douglas, J., concurring).
The high service rendered by the "cruel and unusual punishment" clause of the
Eighth Amendment is to require legislatures to write penal laws that are
evenhanded, nonselective, and nonarbitrary, and to require judges to see to it that
general laws are not applied sparsely, selectively, and spottily to unpopular groups.
Id.
18. Although the Department of Justice has noted a steady decline in homicides since 1991,
there were still 15,533 homicides nationwide in 1999. With an average of 5.7 homicides per
100,000 people, this percentage applied to the current population of 287,889,982 would provide
for an estimate of 16,409 homicides this year. Department of Justice website, at http://www.
ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/tables/totalstab.htm.
19. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 364-66 (Marshall, J., concurring).
20. See id. at 293 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("When the punishment of death is inflicted in a
trivial number of the cases in which it is legally available, the conclusion is virtually inescapable
that it is being inflicted arbitrarily. Indeed, it smacks of little more than a lottery system.").
21. See id.
22. See supra note 20.
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did not charge O.J. Simpson with capital murder when at the very time
of his trial another African-American man who killed but one person
was charged with capital murder and eventually so sentenced.23 That
other man was poor.24 He was represented by a public defender, and
nobody had ever heard of him. 6 Both men were alleged to have
engaged in acts that allowed for the District Attorney to file death pen-
alty charges.27 Simpson allegedly killed two people, a qualifying
event.28 He was alleged to have lied in wait, a qualifying event.2 9 The
other man allegedly robbed and raped, both qualifying events. 30 To be
sure, there are other distinctions to be drawn between Simpson and the
other man and, of course, anecdotal references can be self-serving.
Nonetheless, these two men, charged by the same prosecutor at the same
time, in the same county, illustrate a system fraught with arbitrariness.
Death penalty laws that allow vast discretion in who is capitally charged
and sentenced fail to fulfill the Eight Amendment's "narrowing"
requirement.3'
Murder by itself will not necessarily qualify the murderer for capi-
tal punishment. 32  There must exist circumstances beyond murder that
will single out a particular murderer for capital punishment from the vast
majority of murderers who will not be so charged. 33 Those circum-
stances must be rational, nonselective, and nonarbitrary so that only
those very few select murderers will stand trial for their lives.34 Lying
23. See Appellant's Opening Brief at 4, People v. Jones (June 5, 2001) (Cal. 2001) (Crim. No.
S046117) [hereinafter Appellant's Opening Brief]; Brown v. Simpson, No. SC036876 (Cal.
Super. Ct. 1996); Goldman v. Simpson, No. SC036340 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1996).
24. See Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 23, at 23-24.
25. See id. at 4-9.
26. See id. at 23-24.
27. Compare Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 23, at 4-9 with the events leading up to
the murders of Nicole Brown Simpson and Ronald Goldman in the cases before the Superior
Court of Los Angeles County, supra note 23; additional information can also be found at http://
www.courttv.com/casefiles/simpson/.
28. See supra note 27.
29. Id.
30. See Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 23, at 4-9.
31. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 294 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring):
When the rate of infliction is at this low level, it is highly implausible that only the
worst criminals or the criminals who commit the worst crimes are selected for this
punishment. No one has yet suggested a rational basis that could differentiate in
those terms the few who die from the many who go to prison. Crimes and criminals
simply do not admit of a distinction that can be drawn so finely as to explain, on
that ground, the execution of such a tiny sample of those eligible.
32. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 2001).
33. See, e.g., id. § 190.2 (West 2001).
34. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 256 (Doulgas, J., concurring).
The high service rendered by the "cruel and unusual" punishment clause of the
Eighth Amendment is to require legislatures to write penal laws that are
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in wait has been rightly perceived "as a particularly cowardly form of
murder, '35 and thus a qualifying circumstance in some jurisdictions.36
Hence, the opprobrium heaped on the villain who kills from ambush.37
And indeed, lying in wait necessarily involves planning and reflection
on taking the life of another.38 Launching a lethal and surprise attack
from a concealed position on an unsuspecting victim can rightly be
labeled such an "aggravating" or "special" circumstance, and such a
murderer could rationally be singled out from the horde of his vile breth-
ren, without regard for race, economic status, or any other factors.3 9
Nevertheless, should any death qualifying circumstances come to
be so broadly defined as to include scenarios not contemplated at the
time of its inclusion as a death qualifying event? If so, it has then lost its
legitimacy as a death qualifying act.n° If any of these "special" circum-
stances, these filters through which those deserving death will be sifted,
become nothing more than a thin veil of constitutionality to cover the
specter of killing autonomy possessed by the state, they must be exposed
and extinguished. Their distinctiveness in setting forth who shall be
executed is lost, and they then lapse into meaninglessness while their use
evenhanded, nonselective, and nonarbitrary, and to require judges to see to it that
general laws are not applied sparsely, selectively, and spottily to unpopular groups.
Id.
35. Richards v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. Rptr. 120, 125 n.5 (Ct. App. 1983).
36. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(15) (West 2001), enacted in 1978; COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 16-11-103(5)(f) (2001), enacted in 1974; IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(A)(3) (Burns 2001),
enacted in 1977; MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-303(4) (2001), enacted in 1977. These are the only
four states which currently have a "lying in wait" special circumstance in their death penalty
schemes.
37. Richards, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 125 n.5.
38. See Thacker v. State, 556 N.E.2d 1315, 1324-25 (Ind. 1990) ("In such a crime, there is
considerable time expended in planning, stealth and anticipation of the appearance of the victim
while poised and ready to commit an act of killing.").
39. See Richards, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 125 n.5 ("[Throughout western civilization,] special scorn
[has been] reserved for those who murdered victims in a fashion intended to deprive them of the
opportunity for reflection and contrition.").
40. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 269 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Judicial
enforcement of the [Eighth Amendment] cannot be evaded by invoking the obvious truth that
legislatures have the power to prescribe punishments for crimes."); see also Merril K. Albert,
Murder by Lying in Wait, 42 CAL. L. REV. 337, 341 (1954) (offering an enlightening syllogism):
1. If, before a lying in wait murder can be found, the jury is required to find beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant watched and waited for his victim before
murdering him, then any further finding as to premeditation and deliberation
would be superfluous because the modus operandi itself demonstrates that the
murder was a deliberate and premeditated act.
2. But were the concept of lying in wait unduly relaxed so that substantial evidence
of prior watching and waiting are not required, then the act of lying in wait
would no longer be the equivalent of an act of deliberation and premeditation.
3. Thus, were a defendant convicted under such an inadequate showing of lying in
wait, he would have been found guilty of first degree murder without a showing
of deliberation or premeditation or its statutory equivalent.
2003]
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becomes an easy weapon of the arbitrary and capricious. Has the lying
in wait special circumstance reached that point?
The focus point of this article examines the special circumstance of
lying in wait and determines if, by virtue of its judicially broadened
scope, it has lost its legitimacy as a death qualifying event. First, how-
ever, we must review the constitutional mandate of the United States
Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia that any death penalty law must
narrow that class of individuals deserving execution.4' Secondly, we
will examine the historical underpinnings of lying in wait as a special
circumstance and fathom its essence as a kind of signature event merit-
ing the most extreme punishment. Next, we will examine the specific
parameters of lying in wait as an aggravating circumstance in the four
states that utilize lying in wait as a death qualifying circumstance.
Finally, we will ascertain if the lying in wait circumstance constitution-
ally narrows and thus properly defines those individuals who will face
the ultimate punishment.
I. THE NARROWING REQUIREMENT OF FURMAN V. GEORGIA
The Furman decision consolidated three cases: Furman, who killed
a man after entering the man's home42; Jackson, who raped a woman 43;
and Branch, who also committed rape." All three men were black, and
all three were sentenced to death. The question before the United States
Supreme Court was why these men were condemned to die while doz-
ens, hundreds, even thousands of other murderers or rapists were not
sentenced to die for their acts.45 Were the death penalty laws of Georgia
and Texas, the states from which Furman arose, as written and carried
out, in violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the
Eighth Amendment?46 Even more specifically, the Court was concerned
41. Furman, 408 U.S. at 276-77 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("If... the infliction of a severe
punishment is 'something different from that which is generally done' in such cases, there is a
substantial likelihood that the State, contrary to the requirements of regularity and fairness
embodied in the [Cruel and Unusual Punishment] Clause, is inflicting the punishment
arbitrarily.") (citation omitted). The leading dissent opinion also makes clear that the crux of the
argument in Furman is that "the present system of discretionary sentencing in capital cases has
failed to produce evenhanded justice; the problem is not that too few have been sentenced to die,
but that the selection process has followed no rational pattern." Id. at 398-99 (Burger, J.,
dissenting).
42. Id. at 315 (Marshall, J., concurring).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 240-45 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("[The appellants] are here on petitions for
certiorari which we granted limited to the question whether the imposition and execution of the
death penalty constitute 'cruel and unusual punishment' within the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment as applied to the States by the Fourteenth.").
46. Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
[Vol. 57:311
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with whether the death sentences of Furman, Jackson, and Branch were
the product of the arbitrary and prejudicial application of the death pen-
alty.47 Were these men singled out and sentenced to die because they
were black?
In the four decades preceding the 1972 Furman decision there were
3,859 executions in the United States; 1,721 of those executed were
white and 2,066 were black. 8 Of the 455 individuals executed for rape
without murder, 48 were white and 405 were black.4 9 Keeping in mind
that African-Americans comprised roughly ten to eleven percent of the
American population during this period, the disproportionate percentage
of African-Americans executed is staggering.5" While the Furman
Court noted that such numbers alone may not be conclusive that the
death penalty was meted out arbitrarily, the numbers were significant
enough to at least raise the question of whether the death penalty was
imposed in some manner other than in an identifiable, objective, and
rational manner.5'
In overturning the death sentences of the three men, Furman estab-
lished that the constitutional guidelines for the various death penalty
schemes serve to protect against the arbitrary imposition of the death
penalty. 52 Four of the five concurring Justices in Furman made it abun-
47. See id. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring).
48. Id. at 364 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Douglas also cites one study in Texas which
found that:
Application of the death penalty is unequal: most of those executed were poor,
young, and ignorant.
Seventy-five of the 460 cases involved co-defendants, who, under Texas law,
were given separate trials. In several instances where a white and a Negro were co-
defendants, the white was sentenced to life imprisonment or a term of years, and the
Negro was given the death penalty.
Another ethnic disparity is found in the type of sentence imposed for rape. The
Negro convicted of rape is far more likely to get the death penalty than a term
sentence, whereas whites and Latins are far more likely to get a term sentence than
the death penalty.
Id. at 250-51 (Douglas, J., concurring) (citing Koeninger, Capital Punishment in Texas, 1924-
1968, 15 CRIME & DELIN. 132, 141 (1969)).
49. Id.
50. The percentage of African-Americans among the total population in 1930 was 9.6%; in
1940 it was 9.7%; in 1950 it was 9.8%; in 1960 it was 10.3%. All statistical data taken from http:/
/www.fisher.lib.virginia.edu/census.
51. Furman, 408 U.S. at 250 n.15 (Douglas, J., concurring) (noting that "something more
than chance has operated over the years to produce this racial difference.... Too many unknown
or presently immeasurable factors prevent our making definitive statements about the relationship.
Nevertheless, because the Negro/high-execution association is statistically present, some suspicion
of racial discrimination can hardly be avoided") (citation omitted).
52. See id. at 256 (Douglas, J., concurring).
The high service rendered by the "cruel and unusual" punishment clause of the
Eighth Amendment is to require legislatures to write penal laws that are
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dantly clear that:
The high service rendered by the "cruel and unusual punishment"
clause of the Eighth Amendment is to require legislatures to write
penal laws that are evenhanded, nonselective, and nonarbitrary, and
to require judges to see to it that general laws are not applied
sparsely, selectively, and spottily to unpopular groups.53
The Furman Court's most pressing concerns were not that the death
penalty was unconstitutional (addressed and discarded in Gregg v. Geor-
gia54 ) or violated equal protection (addressed and discarded in McClesky
v. Kemp55), but rather the dire need for legislative restraints on how the
evenhanded, nonselective, and nonarbitrary, and to require judges to see to it that
general laws are not applied sparsely, selectively, and spottily to unpopular groups.
Id.
53. Id. (Douglas, J., concurring).
54. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). Gregg involved a defendant who was charged with armed robbery
and murder. Id. at 158. In accordance with Georgia procedure in capital cases, the trial was in
two stages: a guilt stage and a sentencing stage. Id. The judge charged the jury that, in
determining what sentence was appropriate, the jury was free to consider the facts and
circumstances, if any, presented by the parties in mitigation or aggravation. Id. at 161. Finally,
the judge instructed the jury that it would not be authorized to consider imposing the penalty of
death unless it first found beyond a reasonable doubt one of these aggravating circumstances:
One-That the offense of murder was committed while the offender was
engaged in the commission of two other capital felonies, to-wit the armed robbery
of [Simmons and Moore].
Two-That the offender committed the offense of murder for the purpose of
receiving money and the automobile described in the indictment.
Three-The offense of murder was outrageously and wantonly vile, horrible
and inhuman, in that they [sic] involved the depravity of [the] mind of the
defendant.
Id. at 161 (Stewart, J., concurring) (alterations in original). "Finding the first and second of these
circumstances, the jury returned verdicts of death on each count." Id. Answering the defendant's
contention that the death penalty is unconstitutional per se, the Court held:
In sum, we cannot say that the judgment of the Georgia Legislature that capital
punishment may be necessary in some cases is clearly wrong. Considerations of
federalism, as well as respect for the ability of a legislature to evaluate, in terms of
its particular State, the moral consensus concerning the death penalty and its social
utility as a sanction, require us to conclude, in the absence of more convincing
evidence, that the infliction of death as a punishment for murder is not without
justification and thus is not unconstitutionally severe.
Id. at 186-87.
55. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). McCleskey involved a black man who was convicted of two counts
of armed robbery and one count of murder in the Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia, on
October 12, 1978. Id. at 283. McCleskey's convictions arose out of the robbery of a furniture
store and the killing of a white police officer during the robbery. The jury found that two
aggravating circumstances existed beyond a reasonable doubt: the murder was committed during
the course of an armed robbery, and the murder was committed upon a peace officer engaged in
the performance of his duties. McCleskey was sentenced to death. The court stated:
Because McCleskey's sentence was imposed under Georgia sentencing
procedures that focus discretion "on the particularized nature of the crime and the
particularized characteristics of the individual defendant," we lawfully may presume
that McCleskey's death sentence was not "wantonly and freakishly" imposed, and
[Vol. 57:311
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death penalty may be administered and the insistence that "this 'restraint
upon legislatures' possesses an 'expansive and vital character' that is
'essential .. . to the rule of law and the maintenance of individual
freedom.' "56
Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White, and Marshall found that
the death penalty laws of Georgia and Texas failed to ensure that the
death penalty was administered in a rational, evenhanded, and nondis-
criminatory manner.57 Given that the Georgia and Texas death penalty
schemes were typical of the schemes of the other death penalty states,
the Furman decision essentially invalidated all death penalty schemes in
the United States, reasoning that those laws failed to extinguish arbitrari-
ness in the imposition of death.58
The death penalty, if it is not to run afoul of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause, must in an evenhanded, nondiscriminatory manner
narrowly distinguish those individuals designated for execution from the
broader class of murderers.59 Indeed, there must be an identifiable and
rational means of distinguishing who is to be capitally charged from
those who might be capitally eligible.6° The fear is not just that a black
man will be capitally charged, convicted, and sentenced when a simi-
larly situated white man would not, but also that the various death
schemes do not sufficiently narrow the type and manner of crime befit-
ting capital punishment.61 While Furman specifically dealt with race
thus that the sentence is not disproportionate within any recognized meaning under
the Eighth Amendment.
Id. at 308 (citations omitted).
56. Furman, 408 U.S. at 267 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Weems v. United States, 217
U.S. 349, 376-77 (1910)).
57. See id. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 305-06 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at
309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 313-14 (White, J., concurring); id. at 370-71 (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
58. See supra note 57.
59. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 256 (Douglas, J., concurring).
The high service rendered by the "cruel and unusual punishment" clause of the
Eighth Amendment is to require legislatures to write penal laws that are
evenhanded, nonselective, and nonarbitrary, and to require judges to see to it that
general laws are not applied sparsely, selectively, and spottily to unpopular groups.
Id.
60. See id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("I simply conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit
this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed.").
61. See id. at 253 (Douglas, J., concurring).
[W]e deal with a system of law and of justice that leaves to the uncontrolled
discretion of judges or juries the determination whether defendants committing
these crimes should die or be imprisoned. Under these laws no standards govern the
selection of the penalty. People live or die, dependent on the whim of one man or of
12.
2003]
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discrimination in meting out death, the holding was a clarion call against
any manner of the arbitrary institution of death. The Court demanded
that death schemes as set forth and interpreted by judicial review must
provide clarity and guidance against any arbitrary abuse of the scheme.62
In outlining just how courts are to put constitutional restraints on
the legislature's ability to prescribe punishments for crimes, Justice
Brennan in Furman set forth two imperatives: the punishment must not
be degrading to human dignity, and it must not be arbitrarily imposed.63
These two statements seem somewhat of a tautology. What could be
more degrading to human dignity than standing those convicted of
wrongdoing against a wall and rolling dice to see whose body and mind
will be forever washed from the earth? Even the most liberal legal mind
could imagine a scenario in which capital punishment would be appro-
priate for certain individuals. The fervor of nationalism in most of the
world's countries often finds a way to vindicate purposeful killing and
other heinous acts during time of war. But to impose any of these cruel
actions arbitrarily upon another human being seems to be the most inhu-
mane act of all, falling outside all bounds of human dignity. Arbitrary
imposition of a penalty that allows no moral leeway for mistake is a
practice that "everyone would ineffably find to be repugnant to all civi-
lized standards."64 It is this arbitrariness, so foreign to human dignity,
that the Court in Furman sought to preclude.65
It would be fair to reason that no contemporary American legisla-
tive body would authorize arbitrary or discriminatory punishment.66
Nevertheless, when those laws, through judicial interpretation or actual
implementation, cede power to a prosecutor or a judge or a jury to use
that law in an arbitrary manner, that action becomes unconstitutional.67
Of course, that is precisely the Furman scenario. The death penalty laws
of Georgia and Texas were race neutral, but in the charging process and
62. See id. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("[T]hese discretionary statutes are
unconstitutional in their operation. They are pregnant with discrimination and discrimination is an
ingredient not compatible with the idea of equal protection of the laws that is implicit in the ban
on 'cruel and unusual' punishments.").
63. Id. at 271, 274 (Brennan, J., concurring).
64. Id. at 385 (Burger, J., dissenting).
65. See id. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring).
66. See id. at 255 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("In a Nation committed to equal protection of the
laws there is no permissible 'caste' aspect of law enforcement.").
67. See id. (Douglas, J., concurring).
[W]e know that the discretion of judges and juries in imposing the death penalty
enables the penalty to be selectively applied, feeding prejudices against the accused
if he is poor and despised, and lacking political clout, or if he is a member of a
suspect or unpopular minority, and saving those who by social position may be in a
more protected position.
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in the jury process, African-Americans were in fact executed at a vastly
disproportionate rate.68 In Furman, Justice Douglas wrote that a jury's
"untrammeled discretion ... to pronounce life or death in capital cases is
offensive," and that jurors must "be given standards by which that dis-
cretion should be exercised."69 Douglas reasoned, "What the legislature
may not do for all classes uniformly and systematically, a judge or jury
may not do for a class that prejudice sets apart from the community."70
Justice White perhaps best summed up the Court's concern: "[T]he
death penalty is exacted with great infrequency even for the most atro-
cious crimes and ... there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the
few cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is
not."'" Can it be said that the "special" circumstance of lying in wait
meets the "meaningful basis" Furman standard? As legislatively drafted
in the few jurisdictions that recognize lying in wait as a "special" or
"aggravating" death qualifying circumstance, the act of lying in wait
appears to be precisely defined, such that the prohibited conduct is
clear.72 Yet as courts have come to probe the outer limits of lying in
wait, its scope has broadened; its outer edges have become somewhat
vague.73 Prosecutors aware of such broadened interpretations now have
license to file under these more relaxed standards. At some point the
standard for this "special" circumstance may become so all encompass-
ing as to fit an array of actions beyond that originally intended. If that
be the case, the lying in wait death qualifying circumstance loses its
68. See id. at 249-50 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("The death penalty is disproportionately
imposed and carried out on the poor, the Negro, and the members of unpopular groups.") (quoting
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT: ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, CHALLENGE OF
CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 143 (1967)).
69. Id. at 247 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 207-
08 (1971)).
70. Id. at 249 (Douglas, J., concurring).
71. Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
72. See supra note 36.
73. See infra sections III., A., B., and C.; see also Osterman & Heidenreich, supra note 10, at
1278-79:
The lying in wait special circumstance needs to be reevaluated. Its current
application in California violates the Eighth Amendment and the mandates of the
Supreme Court because it does not serve to distinguish between the general class of
murderers and those deserving death. A California Court of Appeal Justice stated
the situation perfectly in a depublished decision. In his concurring opinion, Judge
Johnson stated that the lying in wait definition "has been expanded to the point
[that] it is in great danger of becoming a 'general circumstance' rather than a
,special circumstance,' one which is present in most premeditated murders not just a
narrow category of those killings."
Id. (quoting lniguez v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 66, 71 (Ct. App. 1993) (Johnson, J.,
concurring), depublished, No. S028650, 1993 Cal. LEXIS 4333, at *1 (Aug. 12, 1993)).
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legitimacy as a Furman narrowing mechanism, as it may be wielded by
prosecutors at their whim to capitally charge in an arbitrary manner.
II. ORIGINS OF LYING IN WAIT AS A DEATH
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE
What of lying in wait? Why has it been singled out as a circum-
stance or event meriting additional punishment? Throughout western
civilization, special scorn has been reserved for those who murdered by
surprise or otherwise in a fashion that deprived the victim of the oppor-
tunity for reflection and contrition."4 Lying in wait for one's enemies
was perceived as a gruesome form of attack even in biblical times.75
The origins of lying in wait in Anglo-Saxon history has roots at least as
far back as the Norman Conquest of England.76 "After the Norman
Conquest of England, the hatred of the subjected Anglo-Saxons sought
release in secret slayings of Normans by lying in wait and assassinating
them. 77 These types of killings were severely punished by the Crown,
and to suppress these slayings, the punishment murdrum (murder) was
created.78 "[T]he crime of killing by lying in wait continued to remain a
homicide of extreme heinousness because of its cowardly nature and the
difficulty of discovering the assassin in such cases."7 9
One author in the twelfth century defined murder itself as: "A
homicide which is committed in secret, no one seeing or knowing it."8
Interestingly, then, a more accurate synonym for twelfth century "sim-
ple" murder was killing while lying in wait or by ambush. "[I]t is signif-
icant to note that the term murder, now embracing any unlawful killing
with malice aforethought, had its genesis in the act of waylaying, i.e.,
killing by stealth from ambush."'" Another colloquium on the dangers
of a murder by lying in wait are heard from Hamlet's father during his
complaint that he was murdered "in the blossoms of my sin/Unhousel'd,
disappointed, unanel'd/No reckoning made, but sent to my account/With
all my imperfections on my head."8" English common law, which has
74. Richards v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. Rptr. 120, 125 n.5 (Ct. App. 1983).
75. See, e.g., Deuteronomy 19:11; Joshua 8:2-19; 2 Chronicles 20:22, 13:13; Jeremiah 51:12;
Acts 20:19.
76. Roy MORELAND, THE LAW OF HOMICIDE 198 (1952).
77. Id. at 198-99.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 995 (1932).
81. Merrill K. Albert, Murder Committed by Lying in Wait, 42 CAL. L. REV. 337, 337-38
(1954). Many earlier cases used the term "ambush" synonymously with "lying in wait." See, e.g.,
People v. Brown, 59 Cal. 345, 350 (1881); State v. Wiggins, 89 S.E. 58, 59 (N.C. 1916); State v.
Rose, 40 S.E. 83 (N.C. 1901).
82. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act I, sc. 5.
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never divided murder into various degrees, still regarded a murder com-
mitted by lying in wait as a particularly repugnant crime.83 In 1389, the
English Parliament passed a statute that denied the Crown the right to
pardon any person who killed "while lying in wait" for his victim. 84
Not veering far from the English tradition, early American law sim-
ilarly regarded those who killed by lying in wait as deserving of more
severe punishment. Many of the states' original penal codes were
modeled after the Pennsylvania statute of 1794, which divided murder
into two degrees.85 The states that followed the language of this statute
held that: "All murder which shall be perpetrated ... by lying in wait" is
to be murder in the first degree.86 One early American case discussed
this vile form of murder as "the mental poise of a wild beast in quest of
prey."87 Justice DeBruler of the Indiana Supreme Court reflected:
In such a crime, there is considerable time expended in planning,
stealth and anticipation of the appearance of the victim while poised
and ready to commit an act of killing. Then, when the preparatory
steps of the plan have been taken and the victim arrives and is
presented with a diminished capacity to employ defenses, the final
choice in the reality of the moment is made to act and kill. This...
circumstance serves to identify the mind undeterred by contemplation
of an ultimate act of violence against a human being and, of equal
importance, the mind capable of choosing to commit that act upon the
appearance of the victim.88
After the death schemes of the various death penalty jurisdictions
were found unconstitutional in Furman, many of the states kept the lan-
guage of the 1794 Pennsylvania statute, which recognized murder by
lying in wait as first degree murder, though not necessarily a death qual-
ifying event.89 More importantly, in response to the narrowing mandate
of Furman, many of the death penalty jurisdictions enacted a list of
"aggravating" or "special" circumstances that would qualify the defen-
83. Albert, supra note 81, at 337.
84. 13 Rich. 2, c.l (1389).
85. See infra note 89.
86. Id.
87. State v. Tyler, 97 N.W. 983, 985 (Iowa 1904).
88. Thacker v. State, 556 N.E.2d 1315, 1324-25 (Ind. 1990).
89. People v. Dunlap, 975 P.2d 723, 751 n.26 (Col. 1999). The entire Pennsylvania statute
read:
[A]I1 murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, or by lying in wait, or
by any other kind of wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or which shall be
committed in the perpetration, or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, or
burglary, shall be deemed murder of the first degree; and all other kinds of murder
shall be deemed murder in the second degree.
Id., quoted in Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 641-42 n.8 (1991).
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dant for the death penalty or life in prison without parole.9" These "cir-
cumstances" were designed to narrow the class of death eligible
criminals, yet only four states included murder "by lying in wait" as an
"aggravating" or "special" death qualifying circumstance. 9' The four
states were California, Indiana, Colorado, and Montana.
It is curious that even though many jurisdictions divide their mur-
der schemes by degrees and most include murder while lying in wait as
among the most heinous,92 only four jurisdictions single out lying in
wait as a death qualifying act.93 Of these four states, only California
continues to incorporate both a statute defining murder by lying in wait
as first degree murder, and an additional statute listing murder by lying
in wait as a special circumstance warranting the death penalty.94 Indiana
had included lying in wait among its "capital felonies" pre-Furman,
qualifying the murderer for the death penalty.9 After Furman, however,
it re-enacted its death penalty scheme so as to include lying in wait only
among its aggravating factors.96 This aggravating factor can be used
either to enhance a non-capital penalty, or to impose the death penalty.97
Colorado did not include lying in wait anywhere in its penal code until it
enacted its list of death penalty aggravating circumstances following
Furman.9 s Montana previously divided murder into two degrees
(including first degree murder by lying in wait), but after Furman it
unified their murder statute and placed lying in wait on the list of aggra-
vating circumstances. 99
90. See, e.g., People v. Green, 609 P.2d 468, 505 (Cal. 1981) ("[T]he Legislature must have
intended that each special circumstance provide a rational basis for distinguishing between those
murderers who deserve to be considered for the death penalty and those who do not.").
91. See supra note 36.
92. See supra note 90.
93. See id.
94. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 2001) (classifying murder "by lying in wait" as
murder in the first degree) with CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(15) (West 2001) (including "lying in
wait" as a special circumstance which, if proved, merits use of the death penalty).
95. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-1 (Bums 2001) (previously reading "[A] person lying in wait
or a person hired to kill who intentionally kills another human being commits a capital felony").
96. See id. § 35-50-2-9(b)(3) (Bums 2001).
97. See Kingery v. State, 659 N.E.2d 490, 497 (Ind. 1995) ("The trial court has discretion to
find that the manner in which a crime was committed is an aggravating circumstance sufficient to
increase the sentence beyond the statutory presumptive sentence.") (citation omitted).
98. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103(5)(f) (2001) ("For purposes of this section,
aggravating factors shall be the following factors: . . . (f) The defendant committed the offense
while lying in wait, from ambush, or by use of an explosive or incendiary device."). Lying in wait
was not included under the previous statutory aggravators as listed in CoLo. REV. STAT. § 16-11-
103(6)(f) prior to 1974.
99. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-102 (2001). The Annotator's Note reads:
This section on deliberate homicide encompasses the former offenses of first-degree
and second-degree murder. Under former law, murder was defined as the unlawful
killing of a human being with malice aforethought. First-degree murder required
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For California and Indiana, an auxiliary task arises when trying to
distinguish between two types of lying in wait: lying in wait at an
enhancer and lying in wait as a death qualifier. One consideration in
accounting for two separate consequences to be assessed for lying in
wait conduct may be the deliberative or premeditative aspect of lying in
wait.' Indeed, lying in wait is the essence of premeditation. Watching
and waiting for an opportunity to strike or launch a lethal attack necessa-
rily contemplates a careful and thoughtful weighing out of a plan of
attack. 0 1 But by taking into account premeditation as a factor in deter-
mining the degree of murder, does it then become somewhat redundant
to punish essentially the same conduct by also alleging lying in wait as
an aggravating circumstance? 2 In essence, unless lying-in-wait murder
and lying in wait as a special circumstance are significantly different
concepts, are those states that permit the multiple use of essentially the
same conduct authorizing multiple punishment for that conduct? 0 3
the element of premeditation; while second-degree murder was any other type of
murder without premeditation. The new criminal code eliminates all references to
malice, employing instead the more precisely defined mental states of "knowingly"
and "purposely". "Purposely", as defined in MCA, 45-2-101, is the most culpable
mental state and implies an objective or design to engage in certain conduct,
although not particularly toward some ultimate result. "Knowingly", (MCA, 45-2-
101), refers to a state of mind in which a person acts, while not toward a certain
objective, at least with full knowledge of relevant facts and circumstances.
Together, these terms replace the concepts of malice and intent. Premeditation, the
distinguishing factor between first-degree and second-degree murder, has presented
a continuing definitional problem for the courts. Many states require that the
offender have had some time to think and reflect about the nature of his forthcoming
act before premeditation can be said to have occurred. Montana, in St. v. Palen, [17
P.2d 862 (Mont. 1947)], held that premeditation and deliberation can be formed in
an instant; thus, in effect, eliminating the traditional distinction between first-degree
and second-degree murder. Under the new criminal code, premeditation is no
longer an element of homicide, nor is there any delineation between degrees of
murder.
Id. (citation omitted).
100. See Thacker v. State, 556 N.E.2d 1315, 1324-25 (Ind. 1990) ("[I1n such a crime, there is
considerable time expended in planning, stealth and anticipation of the appearance of the victim
while poised and ready to commit an act of killing.").
101. See id.
102. See Albert, supra note 81, at 340-41.
Thus, in California a murder committed by lying in wait is, as a matter of law,
first degree murder. For this reason the lying in wait theory is a valuable and
convenient prosecution tool, for once it is established (1) that the killing was
murder, and (2) that it was committed by lying in wait, the prosecution has made out
a case of murder in the first degree without being compelled to allege and prove that
the murder was also deliberate and premeditated, or that specific intent to kill was
present.
Id.; see also People v. Carpenter, 935 P.2d 708 (Cal. 1997).
103. See People v. Hillhouse, 40 P.3d 754 (2002) (Moreno, J., concurring and dissenting).
Moreno exhibited apprehension about the differences between first degree murder by lying in wait
and the lying in wait special circumstance by saying:
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III. DISTINCTIONS IN MURDER BY LYING IN WAIT AND LYING IN
WAIT AS AN AGGRAVATING FACTOR
In comparing and drawing distinctions between lying in wait mur-
der and lying in wait as an aggravating circumstance, we start with the
former, as it has the more significant legislative and judicial history. °4
The most often quoted early American case discussing lying in wait
murder offered a simplistic definition: "to constitute lying in wait, three
things must concur, to-wit, waiting, watching, and secrecy; and that
these facts must be established beyond a reasonable doubt, to authorize
the conclusion that there was such lying in wait."' ° It is these three
elements: waiting, watching, and secrecy, or concealment, that are the
essentials of lying-in-wait murder. It is within these essentials, however,
where judicial and legislative interpretations vary. Different courts have
held:
The requisites of watching and waiting do not necessarily
require that a constant, unrelenting vigil be maintained. It is no
defense that defendant fell asleep while lying in wait for his victim,
for though the murder occurs after the killer has himself awakened or
where the victim awakens his own murderer, the vigil remains unbro-
ken for purposes of satisfying the requirements of a lying in wait. 106
The element of waiting has also not been strictly interpreted to
mean that the defendant must always wait for his victim to come to him;
it might also contemplate a situation where the murderer sought out the
deceased.0 7 And what of concealment?' 8 There is some common law
precedent that physical concealment from the victim is a necessary fac-
tor of lying in wait murder, 10 9 but there is ample authority to the con-
trary.'1 0 Indeed, some courts conclude that a complete absence of
concealment would not necessarily preclude a finding of lying in wait
It is undisputed that defendant concealed his purpose to kill the victim until he
felt the circumstances were conducive to committing the crime, but that is not
enough to constitute lying in wait. If it were, most premeditated murders would
involve lying in wait and this special circumstance would not perform its function of
narrowing "'the class of persons eligible for the death penalty.'"
Id. at 784 (citation omitted).
104. See supra section II.
105. Riley v. State, 28 Tenn. (9 Humph.) 646, 651 (1849).
106. Albert, supra note 81, at 338 (citing People v. Byrd, 266 P.2d 505 (Cal. 1954); People v.
Tuthill, 187 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1947)).
107. People v. Byrd, 266 P.2d 505 (Cal. 1954).
108. See Albert, supra note 81, at 338.
109. See, e.g., State v. Cross, 26 N.W. 62 (Iowa 1885); Riley v. State, 28 Tenn. (9 Humph.)
438 (1849).
110. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 30 So. 484 (Ala. 1901); People v. Tuthill, 187 P.2d 16 (Cal.
1947); State v. Dooley, 57 N.W. 414 (Iowa 1894); State v. Henderson, 85 S.W. 576 (Mo. 1905);
State v. Jackson, 230 P. 370 (Mont. 1924); State v. Walker, 86 S.E. 1055 (N.C. 1915).
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murder."'I In 1953, Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court set
forth what has become a common definition of lying in wait murder:
"The gist of lying in wait is that the person places himself in a position
where he is waiting and watching and concealed from the person killed
with the intention of inflicting bodily injury upon such person or of kill-
ing such person."' 12 As evidenced by his choice of words, Justice Tray-
nor articulated the belief that the defendant must be physically concealed
from the victim in order for him to murder by lying in wait."I3
How then does lying in wait murder differ from lying in wait as a
special or aggravating death qualifying circumstance? The most mean-
ingful distinction between the two concepts is their use. Lying-in-wait
murder, as suggested earlier, is a factor in determining the degree of
murder. If the elements of watching and waiting and concealment are
present, the state certainly has a basis for escalating the ensuing murder
to the greatest degree.' '4 And again, as previously suggested, such cir-
cumstances contemplate premeditation, which is typically sufficient jus-
tification for a first-degree murder prosecution." 1 5
In sharp contrast, the only purpose in alleging lying in wait as an
aggravating circumstance is to death qualify the perpetrator." 6 In filing
such an "aggravator," the state is alleging that the particular circum-
stance of lying in wait is heinous enough and specific enough to single
out this particular perpetrator for execution. It is Furman, then, that
compels the distinction between lying in wait murder and lying in wait
as a death qualifying event. And inexorably it is Furman that demands
that the latter be much narrower and more focused in order to provide a
"meaningful basis" before someone is to be executed.'
11l. See supra note 110.
112. People v. Thomas, 261 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1953) (Traynor, J., concurring).
There is nothing in the law that requires that the "lying in wait" exist for or consume
any particular period of time before the firing of a shot or other act which caused the
death. It is only necessary that the act causing death be preceded by and the
outgrowth of the "lying in wait." Where the killing is by "lying in wait," and the act
causing death was intentional, it is murder of the first degree, whether the killing
was intentional or unintentional, as in such case it is not necessary that there exist in
the mind of the perpetrator an intent to kill.
Id. at 4 (internal quotations omitted).
113. Id. at 7.
114. See supra note 1I.
115. See id.
116. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(15) (West 2001).
117. See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 468 (1984) (White, J., concurring).
In the 12 years since Furman v. Georgia, every Member of this Court has
written or joined at least one opinion endorsing the proposition that because of its
severity and irrevocability, the death penalty is qualitatively different from any other
punishment, and hence must be accompanied by unique safeguards to ensure that it
is a justified response to a given offense.
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How must the lying in wait aggravating circumstance be defined to
allow for a meaningful distinction? "[T]he terms 'lying in wait' and
'ambush' have well-founded roots in common and legal parlance, and
thus the aggravator has a 'common sense core of meaning ... that crimi-
nal juries should be capable of understanding."" 18 Unfortunately, such
a common sense understanding has proved elusive. Although many
decisions purport to apply a readily understandable definition of lying in
wait,' '9 it is debatable whether "[t]he words themselves contain their
own restraint, they have not been applied to allow standardless and
unchanneled sentencing, and they are not unconstitutionally vague."' 2 °
Are the parameters of the lying in wait aggravating circumstance suffi-
cient to meaningfully distinguish this murderer from the larger class of
murderers who do not merit death? Has this defendant been singled out
by a penal code that rationally narrows the list of those who kill to those
who are truly death eligible?
There are three fundamental elements related to a depiction of the
lying in wait aggravating circumstance121 : concealment, a period of
watching and waiting, and immediately thereafter, a surprise lethal
attack on the victim.' 22 Each of these elements served as an essential
part of the factual matrix that constituted lying in wait at common
law.'2 3  Each element has generated its own complexities. Conse-
quently, any careful analysis of the lying in wait aggravating circum-
stance must involve an element by element approach. For instance,
concealment, far from being a straightforward concept, has, at least in
one jurisdiction, included concealment of purpose in place of the physi-
cal concealment of the killer.' 24  Likewise, a period of watching and
Id. (citation omitted).
118. People v. Dunlap, 975 P.2d 723, 751 (Colo. 1999) (quoting Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262,
279 (1976) (White, J., concurring)).
119. See, e.g., Dunlap, 975 P.2d at 751; Davis v. State, 477 N.E.2d 889, 896 (Ind. 1985);
Matheney v. State, 688 N.E.2d 883, 901 (Ind. 1998); Fitzpatrick v. State, 638 P.2d 1002, 1016
(Mont. 1981). The California cases that reference this "easily understood" common law definition
of lying in wait are omitted here because of their detailed discussion in the next section.
120. Fitzpatrick, 638 P.2d at 1016.
121. See People v. Thomas, 261 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1953) (Traynor, J., concurring) ("The gist of
lying in wait is that the person place himself in a position where he is waiting and watching and
concealed from the person killed with the intention of inflicting bodily injury upon such person or
of killing such person.").
122. See supra note 106.
123. See id.
124. California first explicitly rejected the element of physical concealment in People v.
Tuthill, 187 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1947). This view has spawned some interesting responses. "Indeed it
would seem unnecessary, for it is the acts of watching and waiting which demonstrate that the
murder was on of plan and design and for this reason a palpable act of deliberation and
premeditation. Concealment adds nothing but evidence of cowardice or caution." Albert, supra
note 81, at 339-40.
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waiting has come to mean mental recognition of the victim's location
minutes before the murder.1 21 "Immediately thereafter" is most readily
understood as the "temporal proximity" requirement.'26 The lying in
wait aggravating circumstance requires an "immediate" attack from the
position of lying in wait. Yet how immediate must the attack be? Obvi-
ously, an unrelated act of lying in wait two months before the defendant
eventually decides to kill the victim would not present a legitimate
instance of murder by lying in wait. Is a five minute gap between the
lying in wait and the murder immediate enough?
In addition to these traditional three elements, a fourth segment of
lying in wait has surfaced in modem case law. This newly developed
fourth element is the notion that lying in wait results in a position of
advantage over the victim. 27 While this element may have been pre-
sumed historically, greater attention to its meaning has now been
arrested.' 28 Not only must the lying in wait immediately precede the
lethal attack, but the concealment and period of watching and waiting
must have a direct relation to the advantage gained over the victim.
Actions that may seem mysterious or secretive in themselves, but have
no bearing on a cruel and heinous murder, do not belong in a considera-
tion of the defendant's penalty. 129 Much less does a valueless period of
lying in wait that does not result in any physical harm, have a place
among the highly selective factors that supposedly weed out those truly
deserving of the death penalty.
Collectively, these four factors (concealment of some kind, a period
of watching and waiting, an immediate lethal attack thereafter, and a
125. See People v. Edwards, 819 P.2d 436, 460 (Cal. 1997).
126. See id. at 460.
127. This element surfaces in Davis v. State, 477 N.E.2d 889, 897 (Ind. 1985).
In this case defendant did watch and wait from a concealed position for the other
campers to go to sleep. However, he did not use the concealment as a direct means
to attack or gain control of the victim. Rather he went openly into the tent and then
forced J.L. to go with him by the use of a deadly weapon. There was not a sufficient
connection between the concealment and the murder here to support a finding that
this murder was committed "by lying in wait."
Id. (emphasis added).
128. See id.
129. See Ingle v. State, 746 N.E.2d 927, 940 (Ind. 2001).
The concealment must be used "as a direct means to attack or gain control of the
victim," creating a nexus between the watching, waiting, and concealment and the
ultimate attack.
... Defendant did not use his concealment in the tree as a means to attack [the
victim] .... Because Defendant did not use his concealment as a "direct means to
attack or [to] gain control of the victim," and a substantial amount of time passed
between his concealment in the tree and the killing, it does not contribute to the
charge of lying in wait.
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relation between the lying in wait and the position of advantage over the
victim) are the seeds from which sprout the detailed discussions of lying
in wait as an aggravating or special circumstance. Of the four states that
cling to lying in wait as an aggravating circumstance, California has
devoted by far the most time discussing the distinction between lying-in-
wait murder and the lying-in-wait special circumstance, and therefore
our attention will turn there first.
A. California's Lying in Wait Special Circumstance
California is well versed in death penalty jurisprudence, and its
prominence among the states' killing fields was noted in the Furman
decision itself.'3 ° Backed by its list of twenty-two "special circum-
stances," 131 California has provided for a large class of death-eligible
130. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 411 (1972). People v. Anderson was decided during
the adjudication of Furman v. Georgia and was negatively referenced by Justice Blackmun's
dissent. The California Supreme Court was forced to strike down the death penalty in its entirety
because, as Justice Blackmun notes: "California's moral problem was a profound one, for more
prisoners were on death row there than in any other state." Id. at 411. Whether or not California
has absolved this moral problem that accompanies their death penalty jurisprudence is yet to be
seen.
131. California is alone among the states who include lying in wait as an aggravating
circumstance in calling it a "special circumstance." See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a) (West
2001):
(a) The penalty for a defendant who is found guilty of murder in the first
degree is death or imprisonment in the state prison for life without the possibility of
parole if one or more of the following special circumstances has been found under
Section 190.4 to be true:
(1) The murder was intentional and carried out for financial gain.
(2) The defendant was convicted previously of murder in the first or second
degree. For the purpose of this paragraph, an offense committed in another
jurisdiction, which if committed in California would be punishable as first or
second degree murder, shall be deemed murder in the first or second degree.
(3) The defendant, in this proceeding, has been convicted of more than one
offense of murder in the first or second degree.
(4) The murder was committed by means of a destructive device, bomb, or
explosive planted, hidden, or concealed in any place, area, dwelling, building, or
structure, and the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that his or
her act or acts would create a great risk of death to one or more human beings.
(5) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a
lawful arrest, or perfecting or attempting to perfect, an escape from lawful
custody.
(6) The murder was committed by means of a destructive device, bomb, or
explosive that the defendant mailed or delivered, attempted to mail or deliver, or
caused to be mailed or delivered, and the defendant knew, or reasonably should
have known, that his or her act or acts would create a great risk of death to one or
more human beings.
(7) The victim was a peace officer, as defined in Section 830.1, 830.2,
830.3, 830.31, 830.32, 830.33, 830.34, 830.35, 830.36, 830.37, 830.4, 830.5,
830.6, 830.10, 830.11, or 830.12, who, while engaged in the course of the
performance of his or her duties, was intentionally killed, and the defendant
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knew, or reasonably should have known, that the victim was a peace officer
engaged in the performance of his or her duties; or the victim was a peace
officer, as defined in the above-enumerated sections, or a former peace officer
under any of those sections, and was intentionally killed in retaliation for the
performance of his or her official duties.
(8) The victim was a federal law enforcement officer or agent who, while
engaged in the course of the performance of his or her duties, was intentionally
killed, and the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that the victim
was a federal law enforcement officer or agent engaged in the performance of his
or her duties; or the victim was a federal law enforcement officer or agent, and
was intentionally killed in retaliation for the performance of his or her official
duties.
(9) The victim was a firefighter, as defined in Section 245.1, who, while
engaged in the course of the performance of his or her duties, was intentionally
killed, and the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that the victim
was a firefighter engaged in the performance of his or her duties.
(10) The victim was a witness to a crime who was intentionally killed for
the purpose of preventing his or her testimony in any criminal or juvenile
proceeding, and the killing was not committed during the commission or
attempted commission, of the crime to which he or she was a witness; or the
victim was a witness to a crime and was intentionally killed in retaliation for his
or her testimony in any criminal or juvenile proceeding. As used in this
paragraph, "juvenile proceeding" means a proceeding brought pursuant to
Section 602 or 707 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.
(11) The victim was a prosecutor or assistant prosecutor or a former
prosecutor or assistant prosecutor of any local or state prosecutor's office in this
or any other state, or of a federal prosecutor's office, and the murder was
intentionally carried out in retaliation for, or to prevent the performance of, the
victim's official duties.
(12) The victim was a judge or former judge of any court of record in the
local, state, or federal system in this or any other state, and the murder was
intentionally carried out in retaliation for, or to prevent the performance of, the
victim's official duties.
(13) The victim was an elected or appointed official or former official of the
federal government, or of any local or state government of this or any other state,
and the killing was intentionally carried out in retaliation for, or to prevent the
performance of, the victim's official duties.
(14) The murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, manifesting
exceptional depravity. As used in this section, the phrase "especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity" means a conscienceless or
pitiless crime that is unnecessarily torturous to the victim.
(15) The defendant intentionally killed the victim by means of lying in wait.
(16) The victim was intentionally killed because of his or her race, color,
religion, nationality, or country of origin.
(17) The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in, or was
an accomplice in, the commission of, attempted commission of, or the immediate
flight after committing, or attempting to commit, the following felonies:
(A) Robbery in violation of Section 211 or 212.5.
(B) Kidnapping in violation of Section 207, 209, or 209.5.
(C) Rape in violation of Section 261.
(D) Sodomy in violation of Section 286.
(E) The performance of a lewd or lascivious act upon the person of a child
under the age of 14 years in violation of Section 288.
(F) Oral copulation in violation of Section 288a.
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defendants. 13 2 It is alone among the four states that include lying in wait
as a special circumstance in also explicitly holding that murder "by lying
in wait" is first-degree murder as a matter of law. 133 Under the Califor-
nia scheme, after determining guilt as to murder, the trier of fact must
then decide whether any of the additional alleged "aggravating" or "spe-
cial" circumstances are present. One of these special circumstances is
murder "by means of lying in wait."' 134 Until a statutory change in 2000,
the lying in wait special circumstance was a death qualifier if the murder
was committed "while lying in wait."' 35 The legislative alteration of
2000 changed the wording to "by lying in wait."' 36 Consequently, the
vast history of California jurisprudence on this issue utilized the "while
lying in wait" language. 13  The distinction is critical. "While lying in
(G) Burglary in the first or second degree in violation of Section 460.
(H) Arson in violation of subdivision (b) of Section 451.
(I) Train wrecking in violation of Section 219.
(J) Mayhem in violation of Section 203.
(K) Rape by instrument in violation of Section 289.
(L) Carjacking, as defined in Section 215.
(M) To prove the special circumstances of kidnapping in subparagraph (B),
or arson in subparagraph (H), if there is specific intent to kill, it is only
required that there be proof of the elements of those felonies. If so
established, those two special circumstances are proven even if the felony of
kidnapping or arson is committed primarily or solely for the purpose of
facilitating the murder.
(18) The murder was intentional and involved the infliction of torture.
(19) The defendant intentionally killed the victim by the administration of
poison.
(20) The victim was a juror in any court of record in the local, state, or
federal system in this or any other state, and the murder was intentionally carried
out in retaliation for, or to prevent the performance of, the victim's official
duties.
(21) The murder was intentional and perpetrated by means of discharging a
firearm from a motor vehicle, intentionally at another person or persons outside
the vehicle with the intent to inflict death. For purposes of this paragraph, "motor
vehicle" means any vehicle as defined in Section 415 of the Vehicle Code.
(22) The defendant intentionally killed the victim while the defendant was
an active participant in a criminal street gang, as defined in subdivision (f) of
Section 186.22, and the murder was carried out to further the activities of the
criminal street gang.
132. Id. § 190.2 (West 2001).
133. Id. § 189.
134. Id. § 190.2(a)(I 5). This section was amended in 2000 to read "by means of lying in wait"
instead of the previous language "while lying in wait." This very important distinction will be
discussed herein.
135. Id. The amendment was a result of the passing of California Senate Bill No. 1878.
136. See id.
137. The history of the lying in wait special circumstance revolves around the 1978 Briggs
Initiative which added ten special circumstances to California's death penalty statute, one of them
being murder committed "while lying in wait." The other nine special circumstances that were
added by the Briggs Initiative were: (1) murder to prevent arrest or to escape from lawful custody;
(2) murder of a federal law enforcement officer; (3) murder of a fireman; (4) murder of a
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wait" contemplates an immediacy, or substantial contemporary between
the lying in wait and the act of killing, 138 that is not necessarily present
in "by means of lying in wait."
The first California appellate court to address the lying in wait spe-
cial circumstance involved a kidnapping, followed later by the murder of
the kidnapped victim. 39  The dominant issue was immediacy, or
whether the temporal proximity requirement was met. Domino found
that the interruption or period of time that passed between the lying in
wait and the act of killing precluded a finding that the killing was com-
mitted "while" lying in wait.' 4 ° The court said that "where the victim
... was captured during the period of lying in wait and was killed some
one to five hours later, the special circumstance clearly does not
exist."'' The court went on to clarify that:
[T]he killing must take place during the period of concealment and
watchful waiting[,] or the lethal acts must begin at and flow continu-
ously from the moment the concealment and watchful waiting ends.
If a cognizable interruption separates the period of lying in wait from
the period during which the killing takes place, the circumstances
calling for the ultimate penalty do not exist. 142
Any other result would have eliminated any distinction between lying-
in-wait murder and lying in wait as an aggravating circumstance, and as
such would most likely have run afoul of Furman in that any lying in
wait murder would be a death qualifier. 4 3 Such a result would have
prosecutor; (5) murder of a judge; (6) murder of other specified government officials; (7) an
"especially heinous, atrocious or cruel" murder; (8) murder because of the victim's "race, color,
religion, nationality or country of origin"; and (9) murder by poison. Id. § 190.2(a)(5)-(19)
(2001).
138. Domino v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. Rptr. 486 (Ct. App. 1982).
To give proper impact to the term "while" we read it as creating a requirement that
where first degree murder has been "perpetrated by means of ... lying in wait," the
death penalty or life without possibility of parole may be imposed only if the
appropriate temporal relationship exists between the killing and the lying in wait.
Id. at 493 (alteration in original).
139. Id. at 488-89.
140. Id. at 493. Specifically, the court noted the difference between the words "by means of,"
used for first degree murder lying in wait, and "while," which was used for the special
circumstance. "One must assume that the drafters were aware of the wording of Penal Code
section 189 and that they deliberately chose different words. A contrary assumption would
suggest that the drafters exercised little or no care in establishing the criteria for deciding between
life and death." Id. at 492.
141. Id. at 493. Presumably, this would not matter for a charge of first degree murder by lying
in wait.
142. Id.
143. In addition to the temporal proximity requirement of the special circumstance, the only
other distinction between first degree murder by lying in wait and the special circumstance is the
requirement of "an intent to kill." As discussed in note 11, supra, California has equated murder
by lying in wait with premeditation or deliberation. This means that there must be an additional
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created a broad class of persons eligible for execution far beyond that
narrow and meaningfully focused basis set forth in Furman.
The California Supreme Court first confronted the lying in wait
special circumstance in People v. Edelbacher.'44 Edelbacher argued that
the murder was not committed "while" lying in wait. 145 The court, cit-
ing the Domino distinction between lying-in-wait murder and the special
circumstance of lying in wait, found that they did not need to "decide in
this case whether the distinction drawn in Domino is correct."' 146 The
court, without explication of the Domino interpretation, found that:
There was no evidence that [the murder] was committed some time
after rather than during the lying in wait and thus no rational juror
could conclude, under any reasonable construction of the statutory
language, that defendant committed the murder "by means of' lying
in wait but not "while" lying in wait. 147
Therefore, while acknowledging the Domino distinction, the Edelbacher
court did not further distinguish between "while" and "by means of."'' 48
The authoritative decision that laid the foundation of the California
Supreme Court's jurisprudence regarding the lying in wait special cir-
cumstance was its 1989 decision in People v. Morales."' In that case,
the defendant and an accomplice planned to kill a woman by strangling
her with a belt. 50 The men lured the victim into a car, and while driving
her to another location Morales tried to strangle her with his belt until it
broke.' 5 ' When he realized that she was still breathing, he beat her on
the head until she was either unconscious or dead, dragged her body into
a field, and then stabbed her four times to ensure her death. 52
The Morales court dismissed the defendant's assertion that this
murder did not occur "while" lying in wait, as required under the lan-
guage of the special circumstance statute.'53 The court cited Domino's
mens rea, or "intent to kill" in the special circumstance to differentiate it from first degree murder,
but this distinction has almost no realistic chance of application as discussed in section IV infra.
144. 766 P.2d I (Cal. 1989). The California Supreme Court had discussed the details of
murder by lying in wait at length in People v. Thomas, 156 P.2d 7 (Cal. 1945); People v. Tuthill,
187 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1947); and People v. Byrd, 266 P.2d 505 (Cal. 1954).
145. Edelbacher, 766 P.2d at 24. Defendant Edelbacher had shot his estranged wife through
her kitchen window in the nighttime. Id. at 7. The court conjectured that "the victim was
obviously taken unawares, and the shooter was not observed either before or after the shooting."
Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. 770 P.2d 244 (Cal. 1989).
150. Id. at 249.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. Id. at 261.
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rationale that there can be no cognizable.,interruption between the period
of lying in wait and the killing. Significantly, the court explained, as it
did in Edelbacher, that it did not need to "consider the validity of Dom-
ino's restrictive interpretation of the special circumstances provision." 
154
That is, it again found that "the evidence in this case clearly would sup-
port a finding that defendant's lethal acts flowed continuously from the
moment he commenced his surprise attack."' 155 Although the defen-
dant's initial attempt to strangle the victim failed, the court found that
there was no cognizable interruption between the period of watchful
waiting and "the commencement of the murderous and continuous
assault which ultimately caused her death."' 56
Additionally, Morales attacked the lying in wait special circum-
stance, maintaining that he did not physically conceal himself from the
victim preceding the murder. Citing a number of cases interpreting
lying in wait as a type of first degree murder, the court stated that the
concealment element "may manifest itself by either an ambush or by the
creation of a situation where the victim is taken unawares even though
he sees his murderer."'57 Finding that Morales's concealment of pur-
pose was sufficient, the court held that
the jury . . . was properly instructed on the concealment element of
the lying-in-wait special circumstance ... based on [the] defendant's
watchful waiting, from a position of advantage in the back seat, while
the car was driven to a more isolated area, and his sudden surprise
attack, from behind and without warning.' 58
The court distinguished an earlier decision which had "rejected the argu-
ment that the element of concealment could be satisfied merely by tak-
ing the victim 'unawares' from behind."'' 59 The court found this element
expendable 60 despite language in a previous decision that stated that
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 258-59 (quoting People v. Ward, 103 Cal. Rptr. 671, 679 (Ct. App. 1972) (emphasis
added)).
158. Id. at 259.
159. Id. at 260 (distinguishing Richards v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. Rptr. 120 (Ct. App. 1983)).
160. Id. at 258. The court insisted:
While concealment is an element . . . . it is only a concealment which puts the
defendant in a position of advantage from which it can be inferred that lying in wait
was part of the defendant's plan to take his victim by surprise.
As the Sassounian court explained, concealment, in the sense that the
defendant uses the term, is not required in order to justify and support a 'lying-in-
wait' special circumstance. The concealment which is required, is that which puts
the defendant in a position of advantage, from which the factfinder can infer that
lying-in-wait was part of the defendant's plan to take the victim by surprise. It is
sufficient that a defendant's true intent and purpose were concealed by his actions or
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physical concealment suggests "a particularly cowardly form of mur-
der,"16 and thus an essential requirement of lying in wait.
Answering Morales's argument that the victim might have already
been aware of the murderous plans, thus precluding any finding of con-
cealment, the court found merit in the idea that "her screams for assis-
tance from [the accomplice] would support a finding that she was indeed
surprised by, and unprepared for, the attack."' 162 This finding convinced
the court that an element of surprise was present, thereby satisfying the
concealment requirement.
Justice Mosk vehemently dissented as to the expansion of conceal-
ment in a lying in wait scenario. 63 "I cannot agree [that] 'concealment'
means anything other than actual physical concealment .... '[t]he gist of
"lying in wait" is that the person places himself in a position where he is
waiting and watching and concealed from the person killed .... 164
Justice Mosk went on to say that "the special circumstance finding must
be vacated: insofar as it purports to serve as a predicate for the determi-
nation of death-eligibility, it is constitutionally invalid." 165 He gave two
reasons for his belief that the special circumstance was unconstitutional:
First, this special circumstance does not distinguish the few cases in
which the death penalty is imposed from the many in which it is not.
Indeed, it is so broad in scope as to embrace virtually all intentional
killings. Almost always the perpetrator waits, watches, and conceals
his true purpose and intent before attacking his victim .... Second,
the lying-in-wait special circumstance does not provide a meaningful
basis for distinguishing between murderers who may be subjected to
the death penalty and those who may not. To my mind, the killer
who waits, watches, and conceals is no more worthy of blame or
sensitive to deterrence than the killer who attacks immediately and
openly. 166
The Morales majority rejected Justice Mosk's argument and held:
[W]e believe that an intentional murder, committed under circum-
stances which include (1) a concealment of purpose, (2) a substantial
period of watching and waiting for an opportune time to act, and (3)
immediately thereafter, a surprise attack on an unsuspecting victim
conduct. It is not required that he be literally concealed from view before he attacks
the victim.
Id. at 258-59 (quoting People v. Sassounian, 226 Cal. Rptr. 880, 907 (Ct. App. 1986) (internal
quotation and citaiton omitted)).
161. Richards, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 125 n.5.
162. Morales, 770 P.2d at 261.
163. Id. at 271-74 (Mosk, J., concurring).
164. Id. at 272 (citation omitted).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 272-73 (Mosk, J., concurring).
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from a position of advantage, presents a factual matrix sufficiently
distinct from "ordinary" premeditated murder to justify treating it as a
special circumstance.16 7
Two years after Morales, the California Supreme Court again
examined the immediacy element of lying in wait as an aggravating cir-
cumstance. 168 In Webster, the court reiterated the distinction between
167. Id. at 260-61. The Court continued:
The question whether a lying-in-wait murder has occurred is often a difficult one
which must be made on a case-by-case basis, scrutinizing all of the surrounding
circumstances. But contrary to defendant's argument, we conclude that an
intentional murder undertaken by lying in wait in the foregoing manner is properly
among the kinds of aggravated killing which justify society's most severe penalty.
Id.
168. People v. Webster, 814 P.2d 1273 (Cal. 1991). The following is the court's recitation of
the factual record:
The principal prosecution witnesses were Bruce Smith and Michelle Cram ....
Smith and Cram provided the following account, differing only in minor
details: In late August 1981, defendant, Joseph Madrigal, Carl Williams, Robert
Coville, Smith, and the 17-year-old Cram were living at a riverbank encampment in
Sacramento. Defendant was the group leader. On the night of August 29, Smith,
Madrigal, and Coville robbed a nearby convenience store. Quick response by the
police forced the trio to hide for several hours before returning to camp.
The next day, August 30, defendant and Williams made one of several trips to
buy beer, which the camp residents were consuming at a steady pace. When the men
returned in early afternoon, defendant said they had met two "outlaws" ("street
persons" or "survivors") at the Shell station near the convenience store. Defendant
reported there was still intense police activity in the area because of the robbery, and
he suggested the group needed to leave town. Defendant said he had arranged to
use the "outlaws"' car for joint drug purchases or robberies that evening. The
opportunity arose, he suggested, to lure one of the "outlaws" back to the camp, kill
him, and steal the car.
Madrigal, Coville, and Williams expressed enthusiasm for the plan. According
to Cram, defendant said he personally would kill and dismember the victim;
according to Smith, Coville said he "hadn't killed somebody in quite a while" and
would "take care of it." When Cram expressed skepticism about defendant's boasts,
he insisted he was serious. Defendant said this would be Cram's first criminal
lesson and would help her become more independent from Williams, with whom
she was living.
It was decided that because the "outlaws" knew Williams, he would walk back
to the Shell station with defendant to meet them, Madrigal would go along. Once
the three returned to camp with the intended victim, either defendant (according to
Cram) or Coville (according to Smith) would kill him. Defendant showed Smith
where to dig a grave and told Cram to clean up the campsite and pack in preparation
for the group's departure. Defendant, Williams, and Madrigal then left for a 7:30
p.m. meeting with the "outlaws." Defendant had drunk beer all day and may have
taken amphetamines. As usual, defendant was wearing glasses; Williams wore a
cowboy hat.
While the three men were gone, Smith and Cram worked at their assignments;
Coville sat and drank beer. After half an hour's absence, defendant called out from
the top of a levee that his group had returned. Four men walked single file down the
trail to the camp. Williams was in the lead, followed in order by Madrigal, the
victim Burke, and defendant. When the four were about halfway down the trail,
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first degree murder by lying in wait and the lying in wait special circum-
stance by stating that the jury instructions properly "expressed the cor-
rect temporal relationship between concealment and attack."' 69 The
charge to the jury confirmed: "For purposes of first degree murder...
the killing must be 'immediately preceded' by the period of lying in
wait.""7 The special circumstance instruction set forth the statutory
requirement that the murder was "committed 'while' the defendant was
lying in wait,"'' thus validating the Domino court "distinction between
'by means of' and 'while."" 72
Despite the explicit language in Webster, one year later the Court in
People v. Hardy'7 3 began to blur the distinction between "while" and
"by means f." In Hardy, the defendants drove to the victim's home in
the early morning hours, parked on a side street, and used a key they had
obtained earlier to silently gain access. ' They rotated the light bulb in
the porch light and "cloaked in darkness, they traversed the hallway to
the bedrooms and killed the victims."' 75 With respect to first degree
murder by lying in wait, the court stated:
[T]he jury could reasonably conclude defendants concealed their
murderous intention and struck from a position of surprise and advan-
tage, factors which are the hallmark of a murder by lying in wait.
Insisting on a showing that defendants actually watched the victims
sleeping and waited a moment before attacking reads the law in too
literal a fashion.176
Although the case primarily discussed only first degree murder by
lying in wait, a subtle confusion arises when the court uses the Morales
elements, which were explicitly used to describe the special circum-
stance of lying in wait, 177 to define first degree murder by lying in
wait. 17  This "confusion" may explain the future tendency of the Cali-
defendant suddenly grabbed Burke and pulled a knife. According to Smith,
defendant moved around to the front of Burke and stabbed him; Cram saw
defendant reach from behind to stab Burke in the chest. Burke protested, and a
struggle ensued. Madrigal turned back to assist defendant. Burke began to make
gurgling sounds.
Id. at 1277-78.
169. Id. at 1294.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. The Webster Court is also the first to draw attention to the other semantic distinction
in the penal code between first degree murder by lying in wait and the lying in wait special
circumstance, that the defendant intentionally killed while lying in wait. Id.
173. 825 P.2d 781 (Cal. 1992).
174. Id. at 795-97.
175. Id. at 825.
176. Id. at 825-26.
177. Id. at 825 (quoting People v. Morales, 770 P.2d 244, 260-61 (Cal. 1989)).
178. Id.
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fornia Supreme Court to eradicate any distinguishing factors of the mur-
der by lying in wait and the lying in wait special circumstance.
In Hardy, the court specifically rejected the defendant's constitu-
tional challenge that the special circumstance statute "fail[ed] to provide
notice, guidance or any principled method to identify a class of murder-
ers that are more deserving of death."' 17 9 Also in Hardy, Justice Mosk
renewed his concern that physical concealment should be required to
find a murder by lying in wait.' 80
The elements of the lying in wait special circumstance surfaced
again just eleven days later in People v. Roberts, 18' in which the impris-
oned defendant killed a fellow inmate as the other was walking down a
corridor.182 Roberts waited for the victim to pass and then attacked him
from behind. 8 3 The state presented no evidence that the defendant con-
cealed himself.1 84 In distinguishing between first degree lying in wait
and the special circumstance, the court held that the lying in wait special
circumstance could only be found if: "(1) the defendant intentionally
killed the victim, and (2) the murder took place during the period of time
that the defendants were lying in wait, or the lethal acts began and
flowed continuously from the point in time the lying in wait ended."' 85
The issue once again was concealment. The court stated:
Concealment may manifest itself either by ambush or by the creation
of a situation where the victim is taken unawares even though he sees
his murderer. It is only a concealment which puts the defendant in a
position of advantage from which it can be inferred that lying in wait
was part of the defendant's plan to take his victim by surprise.' 8 6
Roberts argued that "the only difference between his case and one in
which a prisoner walked to another inmate's cell and stabbed him to
179. Id. at 844.
180. Id. at 865 n.1 (Mosk, J., concurring). Mosk stated:
In my concurring and dissenting opinion in People v. Morales, I set out my
view that lying in wait as a theory of first degree murder and lying in wait as a
special circumstance establishing eligibility for the penalty of death[;] each require
waiting, watching, and actual physical concealment-I did so impliedly as to the
theory and expressly as to the special circumstance. Put simply, concealment of
purpose as distinguished from concealment of the person is not enough. "I continue
to adhere to that view as a matter of personal belief. I have not succeeded, however,
in persuading my colleagues of the soundness of my position. After reflection, I
have decided not to beat a rataplan."
Id. (citations omitted).
181. 826 P.2d 274 (Cal. 1992).
182. Id. at 283-85.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 302.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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death would be locomotion; yet the hypothetical inmate would not be
death eligible on that basis."' 8 7 The court answered this challenge by
quoting their own definition of the lying in wait special circumstance in
Morales and then concluding that "the [jury] instructions, verdict, and
finding met the statutory requirement of section 190.2, subdivision
(a)(15) that the murder occurred 'while lying in wait.' "88 There was no
fact-based analysis applying the definition of the special circumstance to
the case, nor was there an explanation of how the special circumstance
was to be meaningfully distinguished from other forms of premeditated
murder, including first degree murder by lying in wait.
The continued blurring of any meaningful distinction between lying
in wait first degree murder and lying in wait as an aggravated circum-
stance came but a year later in People v. Ceja. 8 9 Ceja was a lying in
wait first degree murder case; no lying in wait aggravating circumstance
was alleged. On the day of the murder, Ceja parked his truck in the
victim's backyard and knocked on the front door.' 90 The victim took
her baby from its crib and proceeded to walk outside with Ceja. The
three of them went into the front yard and sat down.' 9' Some time later,
Ceja shot and killed her.' 92
In answering the contention that the lying in wait first degree mur-
der instructions were unconstitutionally vague, the court set forth the
Morales definition of the lying in wait special circumstance to interpret
lying in wait first degree murder, 93 and in a footnote purporting to
explain the difference between the two types of lying in wait, stated:
Lying in wait as a form of first degree murder under Penal Code
section 189 should not be confused with the largely similar, but
slightly different, special circumstance in which the "defendant inten-
tionally killed the victim while lying in wait." (... italics added to
indicate language differences between the two statutes .... ) Here,
there was no special circumstance allegation, so only lying in wait
187. Id.
188. Id. at 303.
189. 847 P.2d 55 (Cal. 1993).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 58.
Defendant was arrested a year and a half later in Merced. Although he denied
committing the crime, he told the police that he drove his father's pickup truck to
Hermenegildo's house the morning of the shooting, and saw Diana briefly. He said
he left the truck at the house because it would not start. At trial, he presented an
alibi defense which the jury rejected.
Id.
193. Id. at 59 ("As we said in People v. Edwards, 819 P.2d 436, 'We did not require any
particular phraseology in Morales, only the substance.' The instruction contains the substance of
all the legal requirements.").
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murder is involved. However, we can and do rely on special circum-
stance cases to the extent, which is substantial, that the two types of
lying in wait overlap. 94
After this dubious assurance, the court, in the context of first degree
murder by lying in wait, went on to state that the facts supported a find-
ing of a murder by lying in wait. In response to Ceja's suggestion that
he waited too long to kill the victim for his actions to constitute a lying
in wait murder, the court proclaimed: "As long as the murder is imme-
diately preceded by lying in wait, the defendant need not strike at the
first available opportunity, but may wait to maximize his position of
advantage before taking his victim by surprise."' 195 In fact, another foot-
note explains that if a defendant and victim "engage in activities before
the killing not designed to gain a position of advantage, or the defendant
passes up several positions of advantage before killing during an argu-
ment, there is no lying in wait."' 96 Despite this concession, the court
found that the jury could have reasonably concluded that Ceja had not
passed up his position of advantage, but rather "sought and obtained a
position of advantage before he shot [the victim]."' 97 It is apparently
permissible in California, then, for a trier of fact to use circumstantial
evidence to arrive at the conclusion that the defendant sought and
obtained a position of advantage. Moreover, if a significant amount of
time passes, the trier of fact can also conclude (with the same evidence)
that the defendant simply waited until he maximized this position of
advantage. 98
Justice Kennard, although agreeing with the Court that the evidence
was sufficient to support the first degree murder perpetrated by lying in
wait,' 99 expressed concern:
194. Id. at 59 n.2 (citations omitted).
195. Id. at 63 (explaining that in People v. Edwards, an earlier first degree lying in wait case,
the court had found that the defendant waited and watched until the victims reached the place of
maximum vulnerability before shooting and upheld a finding of murder by lying in wait).
196. Id. at 61 n.3.
197. Id. at 62.
198. Id. The court explained its reasoning:
When defendant met Diana at the door, others were nearby. He tried to get her alone
in the backyard, near his truck. When that failed, he lured her to the front yard, a
"more isolated area" than the house, although perhaps not as ideal for his purposes
as the backyard. It was not, however, until Roque returned to the house after
accompanying defendant and Diana to the front yard that defendant was finally
alone with his victim. At that point, the jury could reasonably find, defendant
seized his advantage, and attacked. That the victim resisted long enough to cry for
help, and for others to run out and witness the shooting, does not vitiate the lying in
wait.
Id. (citations omitted).
199. Id. at 63-64 (Kennard, J., concurring).
Here, the prosecution used the lying-in-wait theory only as the basis for a charge of
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[T]he lying-in-wait special circumstance must provide a meaningful
basis for distinguishing capital and non capital cases, so that the death
penalty will not be imposed in an arbitrary or irrational manner.
Recent decisions of this Court have given expansive definitions to the
term "lying in wait," while drawing little distinction between "lying
in wait" as a form of first degree murder and the lying-in-wait special
circumstance, which subjects a defendant to the death penalty. 2°°
Included in the decisions in which she finds this troubling predicament
are Hardy, Webster, and Morales.20 Justice Kennard continued:
I have a growing concern ... that these decisions may have under-
mined the critical narrowing function of the lying-in-wait special cir-
cumstance: to separate defendants whose acts warrant the death
penalty from those defendants who are "merely" guilty of first degree
murder. But because the prosecution in this case did not charge
defendant with a lying-in-wait special circumstance, I need not fur-
ther explore the possible differences between murder by lying in wait
and the lying-in-wait special circumstance here.20 2
In dissent, Justice Mosk echoed the concerns of Justice Kennard: "At
trial, there were indeed isolated pieces of evidence that bore on 'wait-
ing,' 'watching,' and 'concealment' as discrete facts. But, viewed in its
entirety, the evidence did not establish an underlying, and unifying, fatal
plan. 20 3 Justice Mosk continued to maintain that physical concealment
should be required.20 4
People v. Edwards was another dynamic rendering of California's
view of the lying in wait special circumstance.2 °5 In that case, Edwards
had entered a campsite around eleven a.m.2 °6 Three hours later, two
girls were leaving the campsite to have a picnic lunch in a nearby area,
first degree murder. But lying in wait can also be a special circumstance, rendering
a criminal defendant eligible for the death penalty. (See Pen.Code, § 190.2, subd.
(a)(15) ["The defendant intentionally killed the victim while lying in wait."].) In this
case, however, defendant was not charged with this special circumstance....
Id. (footnote omitted).
200. Id. at 63 (Kennard, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
201. See id.
202. Id. at 64 (Kennard, J., concurring).
203. Id. at 65 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
Quite the contrary, it revealed a tragic fortuity. The last encounter between
defendant and the victim was similar to many that preceded it during the course of
their stormy relationship. It was different in this: Maria Ortega spit a "nasty"
remark at defendant. As a consequence, he immediately drew a gun and pointed it
at her; she ran behind a tree; and he then turned the weapon against the victim. On
such facts, a reasonable jury could not have found lying-in-waiting beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Id.
204. Id. at 64 n.2 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
205. 819 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1991).
206. Id. at 446.
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but they first stopped to use the restroom at the entrance to the camp-
ground.2 °7 They were observed coming out of the campsite by other
campers.20 8 There was testimony that Edwards had driven past the girls
as they were leaving, and a few minutes later, he drove his truck out of
the campground towards the girls.209 One of the girls heard the vehicle
approaching and told the other to "get on the side of the road. 21°
Edwards drove alongside the girls, stopped, and said, "Girls."21' He
then fired two shots from a pistol, hitting one of the girls and killing
her.2t 2  Edwards was charged with the lying in wait special
circumstance.1 3
The court rejected Edward's plea that he did not kill "while" lying
in wait.2 4 The court surmised that "the shooting occurred without any
'cognizable interruption' following the lying in wait under any legal
standard. 12 5 Edwards claimed that he drove right beside the girls and
called out to them; the court interpreted this action as a plan to catch
them "completely unsuspecting" and thought that he called to the girls
"so they would look his way and become ideal live targets. ' '1 6 Con-
cluding its rationale, the court found: "The jury could reasonably infer
defendant waited and watched until the girls reached the place of maxi-
mum vulnerability before shooting .... Rather than shoot them when he
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. Defendant objected to the charge of the lying in wait special circumstance on
numerous grounds. Id. at 457. Many of the objections centered on the use of the lying in wait
jury instructions. Id. at 458-59. One of them was that the instructions did not include the
requirement, from Morales, that the defendant achieve "a position of advantage." Id. at 458. The
court ignored this contention by stating that the instructions implied this element and held that the
language included in the instruction, which said that there must be a "'situation where the victim
is taken unawares and by surprise,' combined with an intent to kill, necessarily places the intended
killer in a position of advantage." Id. The defendant next objected to the absence of the word
"substantial" in relation to the period of watching and waiting, but the Court found that the
inclusion of the admonishment to the jury that the lying in wait "must be of sufficient duration to
establish the elements of waiting, watching and concealment or other secret design," presupposed
a substantial temporal element. Id. at 458-59.
213. Id. at 445.
214. Id. at 460.
215. Id. at 459-60.
216. Id. The Court reasoned:
[The defendant engaged in] watching and waiting from inside the campgrounds out
to the road. There was a secret plan to take them by a surprise which was as
effective as any ambush that he could have accomplished from hiding, and perhaps
even more so because this way he didn't have to wait behind a tree or a rock hoping
that they would come his way. In this way, he was able to move his point of
ambush right directly in front of the girls.
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first saw them, he turned around, followed them, and when they had
reached the most isolated spot in the area, struck. 217
The most innovative part of the opinion with regards to the lying in
wait special circumstance was evidence of a "substantial" period of
watching and waiting. The court agreed that the jury could infer that the
defendant first saw the girls when they were walking towards the rest-
room before leaving the campsite. This analysis followed:
Since more than a quarter of a mile separated the spot where defen-
dant first saw the girls and where he shot them, and they were on
foot, the jury could reasonably infer that a matter of minutes elapsed
from the time defendant first saw them until he shot them. This was
substantial. 2t 8
Edwards also argued that the lying in wait did not "result in an oppor-
tune moment for attack, provide a position of advantage, or put the dece-
dent in a particular state of vulnerability."2" 9 The court stated that the
evidence suggested "the lying in wait might have been crucial to defen-
dant's murderous design; it certainly furthered it."' 220 They based this on
the fact that the first victim was shot between the eyes, while the second
victim was able to turn her head and affect the defendant's aim. 221
A year later in People v. Sims,2 1 2 the court once again maintained
that there is a distinction between first degree murder by lying in wait
and the lying in wait special circumstance. Sims and an accomplice
ordered a pizza from a hotel room. When the delivery man came to the
door, they immediately strangled him and threw him in the bathtub.223
The cause of death was either strangulation or drowning. 4 Sims was
charged with the lying in wait special circumstance. The court reflected
that "the jury instruction [special circumstance allegation] included the
requirement that the killing take place during the period of concealment
and watchful waiting, an aspect of the special circumstance distinguisha-
217. Id. at 460. In the author's view, this is precisely the type of liberal interpretation of a
special circumstance that undermines its critical narrowing requirement as mentioned by Justice
Kennard, supra note 200. Essentially, the mens rea required for any crime could be reasonably
inferred from minimal evidence pointing towards such a mental state. When, however, the jury is
inferring an overriding plan, or an effective murder by "lying in wait," it is clear that more than
scant circumstantial evidence is needed. One could easily be delayed in committing a murder or
accidentally concealed from the victim before the fatal wounds are inflicted by no action of his
own, but this delay or accidental concealment should not be factored into the lying in wait special
circumstance.
218. Edwards, 819 P.2d at 460.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. 853 P.2d 992 (Cal. 1993).
223. Id. at 998-99.
224. Id. at 999.
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ble from a murder perpetrated by means of lying in wait, or following
premeditation and deliberation. '225 This was the third time the court had
explicitly endorsed the temporal requirement outlined in Domino and
written in the statutory language that the killing must occur "while" the
defendant was lying in wait.22 6
The Sims court plowed new ground in the watching and waiting
components of lying in wait. 27 The defendant averred that "mere con-
cealment of purpose, followed by a period of waiting, is a characteristic
of numerous categories of murders that are not classified as special cir-
cumstance offenses. '228  The court disagreed and explained that after
placing the pizza order by telephone, the defendant "was waiting in his
motel room and was 'watchful,' i.e., alert and vigilant in anticipation of
[the victim's] arrival so that defendant could take him by surprise, 22 9
thus concluding that the element of "watchful" waiting was therefore
satisfied.23° Although the term "watchful waiting" had been used previ-
ously,23 it had almost always been in the context of physically watching
the victim prior to the attack.232
Three years later, and after two California appellate court decisions
that again addressed the lying in wait special circumstance,233 the Cali-
225. Id. at 1008 (citing People v. Edelbacher, 766 P.2d 1, 25 (Cal. 1989)).
226. See People v. Roberts, 826 P.2d 274, 302 (Cal. 1992); People v. Webster, 814 P.2d 1273,
1294 (Cal. 1991).
227. Sims, 853 P.2d at 1006-08 (holding that the defendant's waiting was "watchful," i.e., alert
and vigilant in anticipation of the victim's arrival so that the defendant could take him by
surprise).
228. Id. at 1007 (emphasis added).
229. Id.
230. Id. at 1007-08.
231. People v. Morales, 770 P.2d 244, 259 (Cal. 1989).
232. Sims joined the long list of defendants who raised a constitutional challenge to the lying
in wait special circumstance, but the Court rejects this challenge by stating that:
We previously have rejected the same contention ... with respect to analogous facts
and circumstances and again conclude that the lying-in-wait special circumstance,
as interpreted in this and previous decisions, has clear and specific requirements that
sufficiently distinguish from other murders a murder committed while the
perpetrator is lying in wait, so as to justify the classification of that type of case as
one warranting imposition of the death penalty.
Sims, 853 P.2d at 1008 (citations omitted).
233. People v. Padayao, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 13 (Ct. App. 1994) is a recent California Court of
Appeals decision which refocused on the temporal requirement set forth in Domino. Id. at 15-17.
Padayao and an accomplice laid in wait for the victim near his house. When the victim left, they
followed and signaled for him to stop. Id. at 14. After abducting him from his car, they brought
him to Padayao's house where he was beaten for a matter of hours, and then eventually
suffocated. Id. Even though the victim was not immediately killed following the lying in wait,
the lethal acts supposedly began at and flowed continuously from the moment the concealment
and watchful waiting ended. Id. at 15. The court analogized this case to the Morales case in
which "it made no difference that the initial attacks proved ultimately to be nonlethal." Id. at 16
n.3 (citations omitted). The court emphasized that the focus is not upon when death actually
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fornia Supreme Court once again heard the pleas of a defendant charged
with lying in wait murder as well as the lying in wait special circum-
stance.2 34 The court pointed out, as it had in the past:
The requirements of lying in wait for first degree murder under Penal
Code section 189 are "slightly different" from the lying-in-wait spe-
cial circumstance under Penal Code section 190.2 (a) (15) .... We
focus on the special circumstance because it contains the more strin-
gent requirement. If, as we find, the evidence supports the special
circumstance, it necessarily supports the theory of first degree
murder.235
The Court quoted the Morales mantra236 and then concluded that the
facts of the present case fell under such a standard. 37 While the specific
facts were unremarkable, Carpenter was yet another insistence that Cali-
fornia's lying in wait special circumstance could be meaningfully distin-
guished from lying in wait murder. This insistence came in the wake of
decisions using the same definition to underlie both,238 the erasure of
physical concealment under the special circumstance,239 the ruling that
only a matter of minutes is needed during the lying in wait to show
premeditation, 24° the new development of "watchful waiting,"24' and the
soon to arrive elimination of the word "while" in the special circum-
occurs, "but whether there has been a continuum of physically harmful acts from the period of
concealment to the commencement of the assault which ultimately causes death." Id. As in
Morales and Edelbacher, the Padayao court found that there was no cognizable interruption
between the period of lying in wait and the period during which the killing takes place. See
People v. Edelbacher, 766 P.2d 1, 24 (Cal. 1989); Morales, 770 P.2d at 261. People v. Lujan, 87
Cal. Rptr. 2d 320 (1999), is the second court of appeals case where the facts tend to conclusively
establish that the murder was in fact by lying in wait except for one debatable element, a
"substantial period of watching and waiting." Id. at 324. They proclaimed: "It is clear that no
particular time period is required for a lying-in-wait special circumstance. Rather, the period must
only be 'substantial."' Id. The court then restated the position of the Edwards opinion which had
ruled that a matter of minutes was sufficiently substantial. Id. Much like the California Supreme
Court's reluctance to ever find "a cognizable interruption" between the period of lying in wait and
the beginning of a lethal attack, the Lujan case affirmed for the time being that no California high
court had yet found a period of lying in wait to be so insubstantial as to defeat a finding of the
lying in wait special circumstance. Id.
234. People v. Carpenter, 935 P.2d 708 (Cal. 1997).
235. Id. at 751; People v. Ceja, 847 P.2d 55, 59 n.2 (Cal. 1993).
236. The lying in wait special circumstance requires "an intentional murder, committed under
circumstances which include (I) a concealment of purpose, (2) a substantial period of watching
and waiting for an opportune time to act, and (3) immediately thereafter, a surprise attack on an
unsuspecting victim from a position of advantage .... ." Morales, 770 P.2d at 260-61.
237. Carpenter, 935 P.2d at 751.
238. See Ceja, 847 P.2d at 58; see also People v. Hardy, 825 P.2d 781, 825 (Cal. 1992).
239. See Morales, 770 P.2d at 260.
240. See People v. Edwards, 819 P.2d 436, 460 (Cal. 1991).
241. See People v. Sims, 853 P.2d 992, 1007-08 (Cal. 1993).
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stance statutory language.242
Then, in 2002, the California Supreme Court provided decisive gui-
dance when it decided People v. Hillhouse.243 In that case, the defen-
dant expressed to a friend his intent to kill a man they had met in a bar
that evening.244 After the victim had voluntarily entered Hillhouse's car,
Hillhouse drove the victim, who had passed out, and Hillhouse's friend
to a gas station. 45 As they continued driving Hillhouse told his friend to
"check [the victim's] pockets." '246 The friend complied, taking money
from the victim's pockets.2 47 Eventually, the victim came to, asked
where they were going, and then asked Hillhouse to turn the truck
around and later to stop the car.248 Hillhouse complied.2 49 The victim
got out of the car and began urinating.25 ° Hillhouse approached the vic-
tim, who responded by telling Hillhouse not to mess with him while he
was urinating.25' Hillhouse said, "I ought to kill you," and then stabbed
the victim, threw him to the ground, and stabbed him a couple more
252times.
Hillhouse was convicted of both first degree murder by lying in
wait and the special circumstance of lying in wait. The court said it
would focus on the special circumstance because it contained the more
stringent requirements.253 The Court quickly passed over the elements
of an intent to kill, a substantial period of watching and waiting for an
opportune time to act, and attacking from a position of advantage by
surprise.25' Hillhouse objected to the finding that he attacked from aposition of advantage because "earlier opportunities existed for [him] to
242. See 1998 Cal. Stat. 629, enacted as Prop. 18, approved by voters, Mar. 7, 2000, effective
Mar. 8, 2000 (codified as amended at CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(15)).
243. 40 P.3d 754 (Cal. 2002).
244. Id. at 763.
245. Id. at 762.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 775.
254.
We find sufficient evidence of each of these elements. Lonnie testified that
defendant told him at an early stage of an intent to kill Schultz. Defendant
concealed his purpose from Schultz until he struck. The evidence shows a
substantial period of watching and waiting for an opportune time to act-which
arose when Schultz asked defendant to stop the truck and got out and urinated.
Immediately thereafter, while the victim was still urinating-and hence particularly
vulnerable-defendant attacked from a position of advantage. He took Schultz by
surprise with no opportunity to resist or defend himself.
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kill an unconscious [victim] in the truck. '2 55 The Court then quoted
from Ceja that "as long as the murder is immediately preceded by lying
in wait, the defendant need not strike at the first available opportunity,
but may wait to maximize his position of advantage before taking his
victim by surprise. 256
Nevertheless, in Ceja, the court had agreed that if before the killing
Ceja had engaged in activities not designed to gain a position of advan-
tage, or if he had passed up several positions of advantage before the
killing, there would be no lying in wait special circumstance. 257 The
Ceja court was content to rest with this assumption because it felt that
the evidence reasonably could lead to the conclusion that the defendant
had in fact surprised and killed the victim in his most vulnerable state. 8
Note, though, that Ceja now presented problems regarding Hillhouse.
The court either had to pull back from its holding in Ceja or hold that a
man who is standing, conscious, facing his attacker, and able to run
away, is in a more vulnerable position to be stabbed than when he is
unconscious and directly within the killer's grasp. They opted for the
latter. "The jury could reasonably conclude that defendant found that
the most opportune time to take [the victim] by surprise came when he
had stepped outside the truck and started to urinate. Stabbing him under
those circumstances avoided having the victim bleed in the truck and
facilitated hiding the body. 259
In his concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Moreno took
exception: "'[A] mere concealment of purpose' is not sufficient to estab-
lish lying in wait because 'many routine murders are accomplished by
such means' . . . ."260 He noted that in addition to this concealment,
there must be "immediately thereafter, a surprise attack on an unsuspect-
ing victim from a position of advantage."26' Justice Moreno felt that
"the evidence in the present case does not satisfy the third prong of the
Morales test. 2 62 He continued:
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. People v. Ceja, 847 P.2d 55, 61 n.3 (Cal. 1993).
258. Id. at 62.
259. Hillhouse, 40 P.3d at 775. In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennard expressed the same
apprehension she had in the Ceja case about the distinction between first degree murder by lying
in wait and the lying in wait special circumstance. Id. at 783. After citing all of her comments
from the Ceja case, she found that because she agreed with the majority in Hillhouse that
substantial evidence supported a finding of lying in wait, she need not explore the differences
between Penal Code sections 190.2(a)(15) and 189. Id.
260. Id. at 784 (Moreno, J., concurring and dissenting).
261. Id.
262. Id. The Court held:
Defendant's brother and accomplice, Lonnie Hillhouse, testified that defendant
stated he planned to rob and kill the victim, who was passed out on the front seat of
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It is undisputed that defendant concealed his purpose to kill the
victim until he felt the circumstances were conducive to committing
the crime, but that is not enough to constitute lying in wait. If it
were, most premeditated murders would involve lying in wait and
this special circumstance would not perform its function of narrowing
"the class of persons eligible for the death penalty" ..... Moreover,
mere advance planning or waiting for an opportune moment to attack
the victim, without more, does not constitute lying in wait. The
period of watchful waiting must result in the defendant achieving a
position of advantage from which he or she can launch a surprise
attack upon an unsuspecting victim.2 63
Justice Moreno explained that because the defendant approached the
victim, spoke to him, and said that he ought to kill him before he
stabbed him, the evidence did "not establish the third prong of the
Morales test, i.e., 'a surprise attack on an unsuspecting victim from a
position of advantage.' "264 Despite Justice Moreno's reservations, the
California Supreme Court found that a man standing and facing his vic-
tim, even following numerous opportunities to attack, killed while lying
in wait.2 61
the victim's truck. With defendant driving and Lonnie seated next to the victim,
they drove out of Chico into a less populated area. At defendant's direction, Lonnie
removed money from the victim's pockets and gave it to defendant. The victim
woke up and, at his request, they turned around and headed back towards Chico.
They pulled over at the victim's request, and Lonnie walked to the back of the truck.
The victim walked a couple of feet from the truck and began urinating. Defendant
approached the victim and said something that Lonnie could not quite hear. The
victim responded: "Don't fuck with me while I'm peeing." Defendant, who was
standing in front of the victim, said: "I ought to kill you." Lonnie then "heard a
thunk" as defendant stabbed the victim in the chest. The victim began "gasping for
air." Lonnie turned away, but looked back when he felt something hit the truck and
saw the victim leaning against the door with his hands on his chest. Defendant
grabbed the victim, threw him to the ground and stabbed him three more times.
It is undisputed that defendant concealed his purpose to kill the victim until he
felt the circumstances were conducive to committing the crime, but that is not
enough to constitute lying in wait.
Id. at 784.
263. Id. 784-85 (citation omitted). This is the first time that the fourth element of lying in wait
(that the concealment result in a position of advantage over the victim) is seen in California.
264. Id. (citation omitted).
265. The most recent California Supreme Court decision discussing in detail the lying in wait
special circumstance is People v. Gutierrez, 52 P.3d 572 (Cal. 2002). Armed with a gun,
Gutierrez waited in a car outside his estranged wife's house on Halloween night for several hours
until she and her boyfriend came home. Gutierrez, 52 P.3d at 585-86. When he saw her arrive, he
put on a mask "to gain easy entry into the home by ruse." Id. Once inside, he stormed the master
bathroom where the boyfriend was taking a shower and shot him numerous times. Id. Gutierrez
was charged both with lying in wait murder and the lying in wait special circumstance. Id. at 584-
85. The court dismissed Gutierrez's claim that the special circumstance did not meaningfully
narrow death eligibility by holding that the "distinguishing factors identified in Morales and Sims
that characterize the lying in wait special circumstance constitute 'clear and specific
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Perhaps in reaction to the troublesome nature of distinguishing
lying-in-wait murder from lying in wait aggravating circumstance, the
California legislature in 2000 amended penal code section 190.2(a)(15)
(lying in wait as a special circumstance) changing "while" to "by means
of."' 26 6 This would not have been so significant had it not been given
life as the heart of the distinction between the two types of lying in wait
in the California courts since Domino.267 The sponsor of the bill noted
that: "The proposed changes are modest and do not ...dramatically
expand California's death penalty law. 268 In discussing the lying in
wait amendment, he stated:
Case law has interpreted this special circumstance to require that the
killing must occur during the lying in wait period, which is almost
immediately upon confrontation. This means that the lying in wait
special circumstance does not apply if the defendant lies in wait, cap-
tures the victim and transports him to some other location and then
kills him.
I believe these distinctions are arbitrary, inequitable and unfair.
They unwisely circumvent the intent of our special circumstances
law.
This bill changes the language in the "lying in wait" special cir-
cumstance to conform with the language in Penal Code section 189
[which outlines first degree murder by lying in wait].269
Apart from the requirement of an intent to kill in the lying in wait spe-
cial circumstance, the net effect of this legislative change is to equate
first degree murder by lying in wait with the lying in wait special
circumstance.
Each of the four elements of lying in wait have undergone signifi-
cant modification over the past twenty years dating back to Domino in
1982. Beginning with the temporal requirement, after the Domino court
initially held that there could be no "cognizable interruption" between
requirements'" which are sufficient to separate a murder by lying in wait from other murders so as
to justify the use of the death penalty. Id. at 613. They subsequently found that "the evidence
plainly established that defendant intentionally murdered [the victim] under circumstances that
included a concealment of purpose, a substantial period of watching and waiting for an opportune
time to act, and, immediately thereafter, a surprise attack on his unsuspecting victims from a
position of advantage." Id. at 614. The most recent appellate court decision dealing with the issue
is People v. Cox, No. D037122, 2002 WL 1804021 (Cal. App. 2002).
266. See supra note 238.
267. See supra note 140; see also Gutierrez, 52 P.3d 572; People v. Fecht, No. B 148759, 2002
WL 1806009 (Cal. App. 2002).
268. Murder: Special Circumstances: Hearing on S.B. 1878 Before the Senate Comm. On
Public Safety, 1997-98 Regular Sess. (Cal. 1998) (statement of Kopp, Member, Senate Comm. on
Public Safety).
269. Id.
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the lying in wait and the lethal attack, the Supreme Court found that this
restrictive interpretation may not be necessary.27 ° Moreover, the
Supreme Court of California has never found there to be a "cognizable
interruption" between these acts. 27 ' Regardless, the legislature reworded
the special circumstance statute to read that the killing need only take
place "by means of' lying in wait.272 Because there have been no cases
ruling on this new statutory language, one cannot be sure what effect
California's interpretation of "by means of' will have on this temporal
proximity requirement. Presumably, it will mirror the standard of first
degree murder by lying in wait in which the lying in wait must "immedi-
ately precede" the murder. Indeed, this is what the author of the amend-
ment had envisioned by saying that the new language of the special
circumstance will "conform with" first degree murder by lying in
wait.27 3 Because the new wording is a less strict standard than the previ-
ous statutory language, one can be sure it will not alter the recent liberal
interpretations of what constitutes a "cognizable interruption." There-
fore, California's stance on the temporal proximity requirement will
continue to be, per Hillhouse, that multiple hours, a distance of several
miles, and a change of mental states does not qualify as a "cognizable
interruption" between the lying in wait and the lethal attack.274
270. People v. Edelbacher, 766 P.2d 1, 24 (Cal. 1989).
271. See, e.g., People v. Michaels, 49 P.3d 1032, 1050 (Cal. 2002); Edelbacher, 766 P.2d at
24; People v. Morales, 770 P.2d 244, 261 (Cal. 1989).
272. See supra note 259.
273. See supra note 261.
274. The Ninth Circuit has also found difficulty in outlining California's temporal requirement
for the lying in wait special circumstance. In two unpublished opinions, it has struggled with the
same issues on appeal concerning the lying in wait temporal proximity requirement. See People v.
Adame, No. B144019, 2001 WL 1575160 (Cal. App. 2001) (discussing a defendant who shot his
girlfriend through the window after she would not let him hold their child). The court held:
When [the victim] complied by bringing the baby to the window, [the defendant]
had obtained the position of advantage. Positioning [the victim] with her child
created a position of ultimate vulberability for her. [The defendant] then waited for
[the victim] to turn around to put her baby down, at which time he moved the gun to
his pocket. [The defendant] seized this position of advantage to ready himself for
an attack.
Id. at *4. Adame was sentenced to life in prison without parole. Id. He contended that
the failure to distinguish between the lying-in-wait special circumstance and the
lying in wait murder charge lowered the prosecution's burden of proof by making
the proof for the charge carrying the lesser sentence (that is the lying-in-wait
murder) sufficient for proof of the charge carrying the greater sentence (that is,
lying-in wait-murder with the lying in wait special circumstance).
Id. at *5. In an interesting concession answering the defendant's constitutional concerns about
lying in wait murder and the lying in wait special circumstance, the court states: "[E]ven if the
statutes and jury instructions for the two lying-in-wait charges are functionally equivalent, a
sentence of LWOP has properly been determined by the California Legislature to be an
appropriate sentence for a person convicted of the special circumstance of lying-in-wait; the
greater crime." Id. at *8. Therefore, the court does not have to answer the criticism that the two
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From the Morales decision forward, mere concealment of purpose
was sufficient to satisfy the concealment element.27 5 In addition, it is
clear from Edwards, Ceja, and Hillhouse that even if there are words
spoken between the defendant and the victim (indeed, a full conversa-
tion in Ceja), including threatening remarks ("I ought to kill you" in
Hillhouse), a trier of fact can still find that the defendant concealed his
purpose to kill.2 7 6
In regards to the period of watching and waiting, there have been
two extensions. First, the defendant does not have to actually be watch-
ing the victim while waiting. This was the case in Sims when the defen-
dant merely waited for the pizza delivery person to arrive.277 Second, a
matter of minutes may constitute a substantial period of watching and
waiting.278
Finally, there is the requirement that the defendant achieve a "max-
imum position of advantage" by the use of the lying in wait.2 79 In both
Ceja and Hillhouse it was permissible to judge the position of advantage
gained by the defendant based on circumstantial evidence.280  That is,
the trier of fact is allowed to estimate that the particular position
achieved by the defendant was indeed what the defendant had desired by
statutes are functionally equivalent (and therefore violate the holding of Furman) in the Adame
case, because the defendant was only sentenced to life in prison without parole and not the death
penalty.
In People v. Weathington, Nos. B147825, BA182367, 2001 WL 1192283, at *6 (Cal. App.
2001), the court said:
Likewise, in the instant case, there was no cognizable interruption between the
watching and waiting activity of appellant and his shooting of Tammy. According
to appellant's statement to police, he sat in the park by a white truck and waited for
Tammy to come home. He then ran up to Tammy with the gun in his pocket. He
grabbed Tammy and shot her. Tammy did not see him coming. Appellant said he
"tried to talk to her." He said that Tammy replied "Oh, fuck you," and he "just shot
her." Mary Ephrim testified that Tammy told her she was going outside, and Mary
Ephrim heard shots "just seconds" after Tammy left. Mary Ephrim's evidence
revealed that appellant remained concealed while the two women and the children
arrived and entered their home. Appellant waited, still concealed, until Tammy
came out of the house alone.
Based on the foregoing, "a jury could reasonably infer that [appellant]
concealed his purpose, waited and watched for an opportune time to act, and then,
when . . . no help could be expected, made a surprise attack from a position of
advantage." Consequently, the requirement that the murder be committed while the
defendant is lying in wait was satisfied.
Id. at *6 (citation omitted).
275. See supra note 167.
276. See supra text accompanying note 167.
277. People v. Sims, 853 P.2d 992, 1007-08 (Cal. 1993).
278. People v. Edwards, 819 P.2d 436, 460 (Cal. 1992).
279. Id.
280. See People v. Ceja, 847 P.2d 55, 62 (Cal. 1993); People v. Hillhouse, 40 P.3d 754, 775
(Cal. 2002).
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use of his lying in wait. In addition, the trier of fact is allowed to inter-
pret the "maximum position of advantage" as it relates to committing the
crime and not taking the victim by surprise.2 81' This is important in light
of the language in Ceja that stated that if a defendant and victim "engage
in activities before the killing not designed to gain a position of advan-
tage, or the defendant passes up several positions of advantage before
killing during an argument, there is no lying in wait." '282 The jury now
has vast discretion in deciding which activities are designed to gain a
position of advantage.283
B. Indiana's Lying in Wait Aggravating Circumstance
In contrast to California, the other three states that include murder
committed by lying in wait as one of their "aggravating" circumstances
justifying the death penalty have a very limited number of cases that
explore the parameters of lying in wait. None of them provide for mur-
der by lying in wait as a form of first degree murder.2 84 These three
states only include lying in wait as an aggravator, a circumstance of the
crime that warrants an enhanced sentence or a death sentence. 285 Indi-
ana, though, provides for two different types of lying in wait. One
serves as an aggravating factor that merely enhances a non-capital sen-
tence; the other is a gateway to the death penalty.
Although there are some Indiana Supreme Court decisions that con-
clude only that the use of the lying in wait aggravator is appropriate,286
there are a select few that actually devote more than a sentence to the
elements of lying in wait.287
Davis v. State288 was the first case to offer some assistance in out-
lining the Indiana Supreme Court's view of the lying in wait aggravating
281. See supra note 279. Presumably, lying in wait as it had been traditionally understood was
feared because of the position of advantage the murderer gained over the victim. Being murdered
without a chance to defend yourself is a particular vulgar and undesirable way to die. By altering
the nature of this "position of advantage," California has done away with a fundamental feature of
lying in wait murder.
282. Ceja, 847 P.2d at 61 n.3.
283. The continued number of cases in California state courts discussing the lying in wait
circumstance remains staggering. For the most recent interpretation of the special circumstance in
the California state appellate court see People v. Gutierrez, 52 P.3d 572 (Cal. 2002); People v.
McDermott, 51 P.3d 874 (Cal. 2002); People v. Cox, No. D037122, 2002 WL 1804021 (Cal. App.
2002); People v. Fecht, No. B148759, 2002 WL 1806009 (Cal. App. 2002).
284. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102 (2001); IND. CODE § 35-42-1-1 (2002); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 45-5-102 (2001).
285. See CoLo REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-11-103(5)(f) (2001); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(b)(3)
(2002); MONT. CODE § 46-18-303(l)(a)(iv) (2001).
286. See Kingery v. State, 659 N.E.2d 490, 497 (Ind. 1995).
287. See Davis v. State, 477 N.E.2d 889, 896 (Ind. 1985) (pointing out the elements of lying in
wait had not previously been discussed in Indiana case law).
288. 477 N.E.2d 889 (Ind. 1985).
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circumstance.2 89 Davis murdered two young boys and almost killed a
third, all under different circumstances.29 ° In the first murder, Davis
stalked a boy in a cornfield, and after sneaking up on him, he grabbed
him, took him into the woods, molested him, and beat him uncon-
scious.1 I The second incident occurred at an acquaintance's house
where Davis met another young boy.292 He invited him to take a ride on
his motorcycle and drink beers with him later that night.2 93 After they
finished drinking beers, the boy said he had to go home, and Davis
grabbed the youngster, took him to some train tracks, and strangled
him. 294 The third incident took place at a campsite where Davis was
sitting and smoking a marijuana cigarette. 29' Two boys walked by, and
he asked if they would like to join him. 296 They agreed, and sat and
talked with Davis for awhile about marijuana.297 Later that evening, he
returned to the campsite and began "lurking around, waiting. ' 298 He
watched where the boys had set up their tent, and waited until they went
to sleep and the people at the next campsite quieted down. 299 He then
went inside the boys' tent and woke up one of them.300 Davis forced the
boy to go near some railroad tracks, sexually assaulted him, and then
strangled him.30
Davis contended that there was not sufficient evidence to prove that
the murders were committed by "lying in wait. '3 2 Beginning their
treatment of the subject, the Indiana high court noted that "the elements
constituting 'lying in wait' have not previously been discussed by this
Court[,] but there is a well defined meaning of that phrase in the com-
mon law."30 3 The court proceeded to quote the California Supreme
Court's definition in People v. Thomas,3°4 and referenced other Califor-
289. See id. at 896.
290. Id. at 890-91.
291. Id. at 891.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 892.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. ld.
302. Id. at 895.
303. Id.
304. "Lying in wait requires the elements of waiting, watching, and concealment for the
purpose of taking a victim unawares." People v. Thomas, 261 P.2d 1, 7 (Cal. 1953) (Traynor, J.,
concurring).
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nia decisions defining lying in wait.3 °, It also set forth the Supreme
Court of North Carolina's interpretation of concealment:
If one places himself in a position to make a private attack upon his
victim and assails him at a time when the victim does not know of the
assassin's presence or, if he does know, is not aware of his purpose to
kill him, the killing would constitute a murder perpetrated by lying in
wait.3°6
Along the same line, the Indiana high court noted that the Arizona
Supreme Court found "that while concealment is an essential element of
murder by lying in wait, the victim's discovery of the defendant's pres-
ence before the murder does not prevent a finding of murder by lying in
wait.'"307 After consulting with these precedents, the court concluded
that although Indiana cases had not discussed the elements of lying in
wait, they had in the past held that "'lying in wait with a deadly
weapon' is a specific circumstance which can be used to enhance a pen-
alty and can be proof of a defendant's specific intent to commit mur-
der."' 30 8 The opinion went on to state:
In these cases, the actions involved in "lying in wait" always
included the elements of waiting, watching, concealment, and taking
the victim by surprise .... Therefore, we find that the common law
definition does apply in Indiana and the elements necessary to consti-
tute "lying in wait" are watching, waiting, and concealment from the
person killed with the intent to kill or inflict bodily injury upon that
person.309
Utilizing this common law definition of lying in wait, the court
applied it to the circumstances of the two murders.3t ° With regard to the
first murder, the court found that the record supported a finding of lying
in wait. The findings showed that:
[D]efendant was watching and waiting for [the victim] and was con-
cealed from [the victim] as it was a dark night and defendant was off
to the side of the road where he could not be observed .... Defen-
dant's actions and preparations show that he had the necessary intent
to kill [the victim] or inflict bodily injury upon him....
Furthermore, defendant confronted [the victim] by surprise as he
called out to him from his concealment beside the road .... Although
defendant then talked to [the victim] in a friendly manner for a few
305. Davis, 477 N.E.2d at 895 (citing Richards v. Main County Superior Court, 194 Cal. Rptr.
120 (Ct. App. 1983); Domino v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. Rptr. 486 (Ct. App. 1982)).
306. Id. (quoting State v. Allison, 257 S.E.2d 417, 425 (N.C. 1979)).
307. Id. at 895-96 (quoting State v. Miller, 520 P.2d 1113, 1114 (Ariz. 1974)).
308. Id. at 896; Vasquez v. State, 449 N.E.2d 284 (Ind. 1983); Andrews v. State, 441 N.E.2d
194 (Ind. 1982); Petillo v. State 89 N.E.2d 623 (Ind. 1950).
309. Davis, 477 N.E.2d at 896.
310. Id. at 896-97.
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minutes, as soon as [the victim] said he had to be going, defendant
bound him with the wire. 3 '
Therefore, the court found that this murder presented a factual scenario
sufficient to constitute a murder committed by lying in wait. 31 2 In the
third murder, however, the court concluded otherwise. While recounting
the facts of the campsite murder, the Court held:
The evidence here does show defendant concealed himself from [the
boys] and waited and watched until the other campers were asleep.
However, defendant then openly went into the tent and woke [the
victim] .... In this case defendant did watch and wait from a con-
cealed position for the other campers to go to sleep. However, he did
not use the concealment as a direct means to attack or gain control of
the victim. Rather he went openly into the tent and then forced [the
victim] to go with him by the use of a deadly weapon. There was not
a sufficient connection between the concealment and the murder here
to support a finding that this murder was committed "by lying in
wait.",313
Although the defendant still received the death penalty on account
of another aggravating circumstance, the Indiana Supreme Court made
two crucial points in the Davis case. First, they held that Indiana recog-
nizes the common law definition of lying in wait, including physical
concealment from the victim. 314 Secondly, they found that there must
be "a sufficient connection between the concealment and the murder" to
support a finding that any murder was committed by lying in wait. 315
These two holdings are important to keep in mind in relation to
California's rejection of the need for physical concealment and the rul-
ing in the Michaels case. The Davis case is strikingly similar to
Michaels in that both defendants did not use their physical concealment
as a direct means to attack or gain control of the victim. 31 6 Just as Davis
311. Id.
312. Id. In rejecting the notion that the temporal proximity requirement had not been met, the
court held:
Although defendant then talked to D.R. in a friendly manner for a few minutes, as
soon as D.R. said he had to be going, defendant bound him with the wire. The
sexual act and the killing then followed within a few minutes of each other and in
approximately the same location. This was sufficient proximity of time and place to
defendant's concealment to support the trial court's finding that the murder was
committed by lying in wait.
Id. at 897.
313. Id. (emphasis added).
314. Id. at 896.
315. Id. at 897.
316. Michaels's actions do not fit within the reasoning of past lying in wait special
circumstance cases because there was simply no immediate connection between his concealment
and the eventual attack. In actuality, no "surprise attack" occurred at all. Michaels entered the
victim's apartment in as unsurprising a way as possible-through the front door. To hold that
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"went openly into the tent" after waiting and watching, so too did
Michaels go openly into the house to commit his murder after waiting
until it was dark.317 This similarity will be touched upon later.
After the Davis case, more recent Indiana cases have simply fol-
lowed the definition of the lying in wait aggravator as provided in Davis
with little new developments. In Thacker v. State,3 18 the court offered a
succinct statement on what it means to kill while lying in wait: "This
aggravating circumstance serves to identify the mind undeterred by con-
templation of an ultimate act of violence against a human being and, of
equal importance, the mind capable of choosing to commit that act upon
the appearance of the victim." '319
The court went on to give a vindication for the presence of this
particular aggravator:
We therefore construe this statutory aggravator as intending to iden-
tify as deserving consideration for the penalty of death those who
engage in conduct constituting watching, waiting and concealment
with the intent to kill, and then choosing to participate in the ambush
upon the arrival of the intended victim. °
Thacker had conspired to kill her husband in order to cash in on a
life insurance policy. She hired three men to wait in the woods outside
her husband's trailer, watch for her husband to arrive, and then kill him
without warning as soon as he arrived.32" ' The court found that although
the men who had waited outside the trailer had lain in wait, Thacker was
Michaels acted "while lying in wait" would extend the special circumstance's immediacy
requirement to the point of meaninglessness. See Brief for Appellant at 102-03, People v.
Michaels, 49 P.3d 1032 (Cal. 2002) (No. CRN 14859). Applying the lying in wait special
circumstance to the Michaels case effectively depicts a front door entry into a victim's home as a
surprise attack from a position of advantage. Included under the special circumstance, then,
would be every murder in which the perpetrator waited outside the victim's home for an
opportune time to enter and act. The inclusion of such a broad category of cases would expand
the special circumstance far beyond the point of providing a "meaningful basis" for distinguishing
death penalty from non-death penalty cases. Id. at 100.
317. Id. at 99 ("The killing did not involve an 'ambush or some other secret design' as the
special circumstance contemplates. Rather, after [their third accomplice] returned, Michaels and
his accomplice emerged from their temporary concealment .... waited for the area to be clear of
people, and crossed to the apartment.").
318. 556 N.E.2d 1315 (Ind. 1990).
319. Id. at 1325.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 1317-18.
During a period of several weeks, appellant spoke with three young men, Buchanan,
Music and Hart, expressing her desire to have her husband, John Thacker, killed and
encouraging and challenging each to do so. Her husband had a life insurance policy
of which she was beneficiary. There was conflict between husband and wife. She
formulated a plan and guided its execution, demanding that he be killed with a
shotgun loaded with deer slugs providing some ammunition, picking out for the trio
a location along a road near their residence on which her husband drove and where
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not at the crime scene, and she did not therefore make "that required
choice to participate in the attack upon the arrival of the victim."3"'
Therefore, the aggravating circumstance was not applicable to her as an
accomplice or accessory, but the nature of the crime was indeed a mur-
der by lying in wait . 23
The next case to discuss the Indiana lying in wait aggravator is
more telling of the court's view of the factual matrix necessary to por-
tray a murder by lying in wait. In Matheney v. State,3 24 the defendant
was given an eight-hour pass from a correctional institute, drove his car
to his ex-wife's house, parked his car, and broke in through the back
door.325 The victim fled from her home, and Matheney gave chase.326
When he caught up with her, he beat and killed her, and then drove
away.327 As part of Matheney's appeal, he argued that his actions did
not constitute a murder by lying in wait.328 Without a lengthy review,
the court concluded that:
It would be reasonable for the trier of fact to conclude that
appellant had used a circuitous approach toward [the victim's] house
in order to conceal himself from her and that testimony regarding the
amount of time involved tended to prove that appellant waited and
watched until he could take [the victim] by surprise. The evidence
regarding his use of a deadly weapon was indicative of his intent to
kill. The evidence was sufficient to support the finding that this
aggravating factor was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.329
This finding was supported by evidence that Matheney had parked the
car he was driving in an alley two houses away from the victim's
house. 33 ° The victim's backyard was also isolated and secluded by
dense bushes along the perimeter.33' Matheney was consistent with
he might be stopped and killed without notice, and directing that his wallet be taken
following the assault because it contained an important paper.
One night, the three joined appellant at her trailer. She requested that her
husband be killed that night, and one of the three said that it would be done. The
trio then left her trailer and drove from it a short distance up a hill to the site along
the road which had been previously pointed out by appellant, where, armed, they put
a log across the road, hid, and waited for John Thacker to come along. He drove up
in his truck and stopped to remove the log. He was then shot and killed by Music.
Id. at 1317.
322. Id. at 1325.
323. Id.
324. 583 N.E.2d 1202 (Ind. 1992).
325. Id. at 1204-05.
326. Id. at 1203.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 1208.
329. Id. at 1209.
330. Id. at 1208.
331. Id. at 1209.
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other court rulings holding that a defendant does not have to be station-
ary or refrain from approaching the victim in order to commit a murder
by lying in wait.332 The Matheney case was remanded and again
appealed to the Indiana Supreme Court.33 3 In the second opinion, the
court reiterated its position that the aggravating circumstance of lying in
wait was appropriate.334 More significantly, the court confirmed its
position from Davis:
Concealment from the victim must be the direct means to attack
or gain control of the victim. It is not necessary, however, that the
defendant be concealed when the fatal acts are committed as long as
the lethal attack begins and flows continuously from the moment the
concealment and waiting ends.335
In the second Matheney decision, the court held that "this Court's
definition of [the lying in wait aggravator] in Davis and subsequent
cases gives the phrase sufficient specificity to survive a vagueness chal-
lenge. '336 They reasoned that "no reasonable lawyer would think it nec-
essary to challenge the lying in wait aggravator on its face or as applied
in this case, given our cases dealing with this issue. 3 37
There are two cases in which Indiana used the lying in wait
aggravator solely to enhance a non-capital sentence.338 Only one is rele-
vant to this article.3 39 In Taylor v. State, the defendant waited in a car
outside his estranged wife's apartment and watched for her arrival. 340
332. See People v. Byrd, 266 P.2d 505, 509 (Cal. 1954).
333. 688 N.E.2d 883 (Ind. 1998).
334. Id. at 901.
335. Id. (quoting Domino v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. Rptr. 486, 493 (Ct. App. 1982)).
336. Id.
337. Id. The next opinion dealing with the lying in wait aggravating circumstance, Fleenor v.
State, 622 N.E.2d 140, 151 (Ind. 1993), was unremarkable in that it presented facts consistent with
all traditional notions of lying in wait. After referencing both the Davis and Thacker definitions of
lying in wait, the court recited the factual record:
Appellant, armed with a pistol, broke and entered the house and concealed himself.
The two women, the man, and the three children arrived. As they settled into their
routines, appellant appeared and unleashed deadly force against the man, shooting
him in the stomach and disabling him. While the others were kept at bay and
helpless, appellant shot one of the women, and again shot the man, both in the head,
killing them. This was murder by ambush.
Fleenor, 622 N.E.2d at 151.
338. Kingery v. State, 659 N.E.2d 490, 497 (Ind. 1995); Taylor v. State, 681 N.E.2d 1105,
1111 (Ind. 1997). In Kingery, the defendant had staked out a tavern and waited for his victim to
arrive in his truck. Kingery, 659 N.E.2d at 492. Based on circumstantial evidence, the trial court
had concluded that the defendant had stayed out of sight until the victim arrived at the tavern, and
then shot him without warning. Id. The court found that "the trial court could have properly
inferred from facts in evidence that [the defendant's] vehicle was hidden, and that [he] had laid in
wait for [the victim]." Id. at 497.
339, Taylor v. State, 681 N.E.2d 1105 (Ind. 1997).
340. Id. at 1108.
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When she arrived, he got out of the car and ran towards her yelling
"[Y]eah, yeah I got you now." A scuffle ensued, and then Taylor began
to drag her by her hair, and as she continued to resist, he shot her in the
head.34' Taylor argued that the trial court had erroneously found that he
laid in wait. Taylor based his argument on Davis, where the court found
there was not a sufficient connection between Davis's concealment and
one of his murders to support lying in wait as a statutory death penalty
aggravator.342 Yet, the court distinguished between capital sentencing
aggravating circumstances and general felony sentencing aggravating
factors.343 Indeed, the facts in Davis did not warrant a finding of the
death penalty aggravator of lying in wait, but in the present case the trial
court found as a general aggravating circumstance "that the defendant
was, in fact, lying in wait for the victim on the night that she was
killed," and this was sufficient to enhance Taylor's sentence. 34 They
mentioned that they "need not resolve whether Taylor's conduct met the
requirements of the lying in wait death penalty aggravator. 345
This finding implicitly made a distinction between a lying in wait
aggravating circumstance that would simply enhance the defendant's
sentence, and the seemingly more concerted and heinous lying in wait
situation which was an aggravator justifying use of the death penalty.
"Unlike the capital sentencing provisions, 'the general felony sentencing
statute's aggravating factors do not limit the matters that the court may
consider in determining the sentence.' ' '346 This separation between
lying in wait as a general aggravator in order to enhance a non-capital
sentence and lying in wait as a death penalty aggravator became a bit
muddled when the Taylor case appeared again before the court two
years later.341 With a more extended discussion of the lying in wait
general aggravator, the court first cited to the Thacker definition of the
lying in wait death penalty aggravator, and then concluded that "the
presence of this aggravating circumstance in any murder is significant
and warrants the consideration of an enhanced sentence. 348 The court
further held that, "[a]lithough the non-capital sentencing statute does not
specifically cite the lying in wait element of a crime as a separate
aggravator, a court may consider the nature and circumstances of a
crime to determine what sentence to impose. '34 9
341. Id.
342. Id. at 1111.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id. (emphasis added).
346. Id. (quoting Bivins v. State, 642 N.E.2d 928, 956 (Ind. 1994)).
347. Taylor v. State, 695 N.E.2d 117 (Ind. 1998).
348. Id. at 120.
349. Id.
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Given the confusing nature of the California decisions regarding
lying in wait, it is easy to see the inherent problem in this last ruling
from the Indiana Supreme Court. They found there is a difference
between the general non-capital aggravator of lying in wait and the
death penalty lying in wait aggravating circumstance without explaining
what that difference is. This is identical to California's struggle to sepa-
rate their two types of lying in wait. Even more problematic, the ruling
in Taylor used the explicit definitions of lying in wait as previously used
for the death penalty aggravator to impose merely an enhanced sentence
on a defendant who had simply laid in wait during the night that he
killed the victim.350 This may be analogous to California's strategy in
utilizing the "more stringent" standard, and then finding that the lesser
standard was necessarily included."' It does not, however, clarify how
these two standards differ. 2
The last Indiana case to consider is Ingle v. State.353 Ingle threw a
brick through the victim's car window while she was at a local pub.354
He then waited behind some trees and watched for her to approach the
car. After she did, he continued watching while she spoke to the police
about the incident and then went back inside the pub.355 Ingle then went
to a nearby campsite to get a ride to Goodwill where he purchased cloth-
ing that he could use as a disguise. He later returned and shot the victim
inside the pub.3 56 The court analogized this case to Davis, where the
defendant did not use concealment "as a direct means to attack or gain
control of the victim. ' 35 7 Specifically, the court noted:
[D]efendant did watch, wait, and conceal himself outside of Tommy
Lancaster's, but his concealment at that time did not constitute any
part of murder by lying in wait .... [Because] a substantial amount
of time passed between his concealment in the tree and the killing, it
does not contribute to the charge of lying in wait.358
The court therefore upheld the view that unless there is a sufficient con-
nection between the concealment and the murder, there cannot be a mur-
der committed by lying in wait.359 It also dismissed the notion that
350. Id.
351. See, e.g., People v. Carpenter, 935 P.2d 708, 751 (Cal. 1997); People v. Ceja, 847 P.2d
55, 59 (Cal. 1993).
352. See Carpenter, 935 P.2d at 751 (failing to legitimately distinguish the two types of lying
in wait).
353. 746 N.E.2d 927 (Ind. 2001).
354. Id. at 940.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. Id. ("In this respect, this case resembles Davis, where we found that the defendant did not
commit a murder by lying in wait. The defendant in Davis watched and waited from a concealed
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when the defendant returned to the pub, he was lying in wait. "Though
defendant was disguised, he did not watch for the victim, nor did he
wait. Rather, Defendant walked to where he thought [the victim] would
be and approached her directly. '36" This final thought evinces an impor-
tant distinction: "Defendant's actions could reasonably lead a jury to
presume deliberation and forethought, yet they do not fit our legal defi-
nition of lying in wait."'361 This is crucial. The court made clear that a
certain kind of "lying in wait" is appropriate for proving a state of mind,
premeditation or deliberation, but there is a narrower and fiercer factual
matrix that constitutes the lying in wait suitable for death sentences.
In reviewing Indiana's treatment of its lying in wait aggravating
circumstance, three highlights deserve mention. First, in Davis, Indiana
decided to adhere to the common law definition of lying in wait, includ-
ing physical concealment from the victim at least until the lethal attack
is precipitated.362 Secondly, in Davis and then in Ingle, Indiana's high-
est court ruled that this physical concealment must be the direct means
of attacking or gaining control of the victim. 363 Finally, in Taylor, the
court distinguished between the type of lying in wait that can be used as
a general aggravating circumstance to merely enhance a sentence and
the lying in wait aggravator sufficient to impose the death penalty. 364
Although the court does not demarcate the precise differences, it is clear
that Indiana, like California, attempts to somehow characterize the two
different types of lying in wait.
C. Montana's Lying in Wait Aggravating Circumstance
As previously stated, Montana does not distinguish between first
and second degree murder.3 65 It does though include an act of deliberate
homicide "by an offender lying in wait or ambush" as an aggravating
circumstance which, if proven beyond a reasonable doubt, can be used
to impose the death penalty.366 Like Indiana, there are very few cases
that discuss the lying in wait aggravator.367 In fact, the only in depth
explanation of this aggravator comes by way of two dissenting opinions
on two different hearings in the same case by the same justice on the
position, but 'did not use the concealment as a direct means to attack or gain control of the
victim.' ").
360. Id. at 941.
361. Id.
362. Davis v. State, 477 N.E.2d 889, 896 (Ind. 1985).
363. Id. at 897; Ingle, 746 N.E.2d at 940.
364. Taylor v. State, 681 N.E.2d 1105, 1111 (Ind. 1997).
365. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-102 (2001) (defining the crime of "deliberate homicide").
366. See id. § 46-18-303(l)tiv) (2002).
367. See, e.g., State v. Dawson, 761 P.2d 352 (Mont. 1988).
[Vol. 57:311
2003] THE PROSTITUTION OF LYING IN WAIT
Montana Supreme Court.3 68
State v. Fitzpatrick was twice heard by the Montana Supreme
Court.369 Fitzpatrick and some accomplices had planned on robbing a
convenience store.37 ° They armed themselves with a gun and some rope
and waited outside the store in their cars until it closed.37' When the
assistant store manager came out, they followed him to the bank.372
Fitzpatrick and an accomplice seized the assistant store manager as soon
as he arrived to make the nightly deposit.373 They took $200 in cash and
then Fitzpatrick shot him in the head. 374 The trial court found that he
had committed "a deliberate homicide by lying in wait or ambush" in
conformity with the statutory aggravating circumstance.375 The major-
ity, without further comment, stated: "Discussion of this point is unnec-
essary, except to state that the evidence in the record clearly proves
sufficient aggravating circumstances exist in this case to warrant imposi-
tion of the death penalty. 376
Although the majority opinion did not challenge this finding, the
sole dissenter, Justice Shea, thought that the statutory aggravator was
inappropriate.377 He believed the lying in wait at the bank did "not
368. State v. Fitzpatrick, 638 P.2d 1002, 1041-42 (Mont. 1981) (Shea, J., dissenting); State v.
Fitzpatrick, 606 P.2d 1343, 1382 (Mont. 1980) (Shea, J., dissenting).
369. See supra note 359.
370. Fitzpatrick, 606 P.2d at 1346.
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Id. at 1347.
375. Id. at 1360; see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-303(l)(iv) (2001).
376. Fitzpatrick, 606 P.2d at 1360.
377. Id. at 1382-83.
The vital question is, of course, whether defendant committed the homicide
while "lying in wait or ambush." The sentencing court found that he did; but its
own findings belie this conclusion. An analysis of the evidence and of the
sentencing court's findings clearly establishes that defendant was not lying in wait
or ambush at the time he killed Monte Dyckman. Indeed, the finding that defendant
was lying in wait or ambush does not relate at all to the actual homicide. Rather, the
finding describes defendant as "lying in wait or ambush" at the bank, waiting for the
person to arrive from the Safeway Store with the receipts from the day's business.
Following are the findings set forth in the judgment with regard to the statutory
phrase ". . . lying in wait or ambush":
"That on the 5th day of April, 1975, being only eight days after his release
from the Montana State Prison, the defendant was lying in wait or ambush at the
Big Horn Drive-in Bank of Hardin, Montana, for the arrival of an employee of the
Hardin Safeway Store carrying the store receipts for deposit in the bank. The
courier on that night was a young man, Monte Dyckman, who occupied the position
of assistant manager at Safeway. Upon his arrival at the drive-in bank, Dyckman
was robbed by the defendant and then abducted in his own automobile, his hands
being bound behind his back and he was taken by the defendant to the Toluca
Interchange approximately 12 miles west of Hardin where, in a secluded spot
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relate at all to the actual homicide. ' 378 He proffered: "There is nothing
from the factual recitation in the judgment ... from which one can even
conclude that the intent of defendant to kill [the victim] preexisted or
arose while he was waiting at the bank. '379  He concluded that "the
defendant's decision to kill [the victim] was a 'sua sponte' decision, and
that all those involved believed that robbery was the only objective.1 38 °
Justice Shea disagreed with the conclusion of the majority because he
thought that the proper intent to kill while lying in wait was not pre-
sent.381 He voiced this concern again when the case was presented for a
second time before the Montana Supreme Court.382 Without offering
detailed aspects of lying in wait, he boldly stated:
Both the sentencing court and the majority have expanded the mean-
ing of "lying in wait or ambush" far beyond any reasonable interpre-
tation, which illustrates how elastic these aggravating factors can be
when a sentencing court is determined to impose the death penalty,
and when an appellate court is determined to approve the death sen-
tence imposed.383
This telling opinion is indicative of the chorus of justices, who, like
those on the California Supreme Court, have become dissatisfied with
the expanding definition of the lying in wait aggravating circum-
stance.384 What is even more discouraging is that Montana's high court
behind a pile of gravel, the defendant shot him twice in the head with a .45 caliber
semi-automatic pistol, causing instantaneous death. That such death was the
proximate result of robbery plans initiated several days earlier .. "
Having thus found that defendant was "lying in wait or ambush" at the bank
while waiting for the person to show up with the day's receipts from the Safeway
Store, the court then determined that this fit within the meaning of the aggravating
circumstance for deliberate homicide, that is, that the homicide was "committed by
a person lying in wait or ambush." There is nothing from' the factual recitation in
the judgment however, from which one can even conclude that the intent of
defendant to kill Monte Dyckman preexisted or arose while he was waiting at the
bank.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
378. Id. at 1382.
379. Id. at 1383.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Fitzpatrick v. State, 638 P.2d 1002, 1041 (Mont. 1981) (Shea, J., dissenting).
383. Id.
384. See, e.g., People v. Hillhouse, 40 P.3d 754, 784-85 (Cal. 2002) (Moreno, J., concurring
and dissenting).
It is undisputed that defendant concealed his purpose to kill the victim until he
felt the circumstances were conducive to committing the crime, but that is not
enough to constitute lying in wait. If it were, most premeditated murders would
involve lying in wait and this special circumstance would not perform its function of
narrowing "the class of persons eligible for the death penalty ...." Moreover, mere
advance planning or waiting for an opportune moment to attack the victim, without
more, does not constitute lying in wait. The period of watchful waiting must result
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has yet to give a succinct definition of lying in wait or any of its ele-
ments. Legal scholars are left wondering what fusion of actions consti-
tutes lying in wait as envisioned by the Montana Legislature in drafting
this aggravating circumstance.
D. Colorado's Lying in Wait Aggravating Factor
Similar to Montana, Colorado's high court has furnished only a sin-
gle case that gives extensive treatment to the state's lying in wait aggra-
vating circumstance.385 The specific language of the aggravator allows
for use of the death penalty if "the defendant committed the offense
while lying in wait, from ambush, or by use of an explosive or incendi-
ary device." '386
In People v. Dunlap,3 8 7 the defendant objected to the use of the
aggravator because, he claimed, "the aggravator utilizes terms with no
common sense meaning capable of consistent application, and does not
inform the jury of what it must find to impose the death penalty. 388
The Colorado Supreme Court said: "[T]he terms 'lying in wait' and
'ambush' have well-founded roots in common and legal parlance . . .
The phrase 'lying in wait' has been used throughout the history of crimi-
nal law to distinguish a more culpable class of murderers from the set of
all murder defendants.1 389 In the view of the Colorado Supreme Court,
that common sense, widely understood meaning is that "the killer con-
ceals himself and waits for an opportune moment to act, such that he
takes his victim by surprise.139" They also reference the definition
offered in one of the California cases, People v. Edwards.391' The Colo-
in the defendant achieving a position of advantage from which he or she can launch
a surprise attack upon an unsuspecting victim.
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); People v. Ceja, 847 P.2d 55, 63-64 (Cal. 1993)
(Kennard, J., concurring).
The lying-in-wait special circumstance must provide a meaningful basis for
distinguishing capital and non-capital cases, so that the death penalty will not be
imposed in an arbitrary or irrational manner . . . . Recent decisions of this Court
have given expansive definitions to the term "lying in wait," while drawing little
distinction between "lying in wait" as a form of first degree murder and the lying-in-
wait special circumstance, which subjects a defendant to the death penalty.
Ceja, 847 P.2d at 63-64; see also People v. Morales, 770 P.2d 260, 271-74 (Ca. 1989) (Mosk, J.,
concurring) ("I cannot agree [that] 'concealment' means anything other than actual physical
concealment .... The gist of lying in wait is that the person places himself in a position where he
is waiting and watching and concealed from the person killed.").
385. People v. Dunlap, 975 P.2d 723 (Colo. 1999).
386. CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-11-103(5)(f) (West 2002).
387. 975 P.2d 723 (Col. 1999).
388. Id. at 751.
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Id. (quoting People v. Edwards, 819 P.2d 436, 457 (Cal. 1991) (quoting jury instructions
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rado high court does not, however, set forth each element of lying in
wait, or even apply its own definition to the facts in the case. It simply
holds that "because 'lying in wait' and 'ambush' are terms that an aver-
age juror should be capable of understanding, we conclude that the sub-
section (5)(f) aggravator is not unconstitutionally vague. '"392
IV. LYING IN WAIT AS AN AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE
Colorado's paucity of judicial review contrasts sharply with Cali-
fornia's extensive work in the area. Unfortunately, the end product of
all four jurisdictions that continue to adhere to lying in wait as a death
qualifying event is that the clear guidelines that provide that "meaning-
ful basis" necessary for Furman remain elusive. And, as Furman made
clear, a death penalty scheme that fails to meaningfully distinguish those
to be executed from those who are not is flawed.39 3 A death penalty
scheme that allows prosecutors to file death qualifying charges in an
arbitrary manner is every bit as repugnant as the Texas and Georgia
schemes struck down in Furman.394 When a death scheme is susceptible
of varied and changing interpretations such that a judge or a jury could
apply general laws "sparsely, selectively, and spottingly" to unpopular
perpetrators, that scheme must be struck down. 395 An "aggravating" or
"special" circumstance that allows for broad interpretation of con-
demned conduct does not meaningfully narrow those who should be
condemned.396
Can it be said that a person who walks in the front door, locates the
victim, and kills him has lain in wait? Is it true that a person who wakes
another from sleep and then later stabs him while standing face to face
defining "lying in wait" as "a waiting and watching the victim for an opportune time to act,
together with the concealment by ambush or some other secret design to take the victim by
surprise")) (internal quotation marks omitted).
392. Id. at 752.
393. The high service rendered by the "cruel and unusual" punishment clause of the
Eighth Amendment is to require legislatures to write penal laws that are
evenhanded, nonselective, and nonarbitrary, and to require judges to see to it that
general laws are not applied sparsely, selectively, and spottily [sic] to unpopular
groups.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 238, 256-57 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
394. See id. (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 305-06 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 309-10
(Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 313-14 (White, J., concurring); id. at 370-71 (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
395. See id. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring).
396. Here, both the sentencing court and the majority have expanded the meaning of
"lying in wait or ambush" far beyond any reasonable interpretation, which illustrates
how elastic these aggravating factors can be when a sentencing court is determined
to impose the death penalty, and when an appellate court is determined to approve
the death sentence imposed.
Fitzpatrick v. State, 638 P.2d 1002, 1041 (Mont. 1981) (Shea, J., dissenting).
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with that person has lied in wait? Furthermore, in the California scheme
that provides for lying in wait murder as well as lying in wait as a death
enhancer, can it be said that the California law as interpreted by its
appellate courts has drawn meaningful distinctions between the two?
While the California Supreme Court pays lip service to the notion that
lying in wait as an aggravator is much more restricted and less inclusive
than lying in wait murder, has that court truly crafted its work in this
area to render that ideal a reality?
In California, either those who murder by lying in wait must
already be death eligible, or the special circumstance must take another
step and rationally narrow in some manner those more deserving of
death from those who "only" murdered by lying in wait. California
seems to have mistaken the lying in wait circumstance with simply hav-
ing a plan. By definition, all premeditated murders take place within the
context of some type of plan (even if the plan is just that the victim will
be killed on a certain day). Since at least Ceja, California courts have
relied on the two types of lying in wait to the extent that they overlap,
but the courts have not outlined how they have remained distinct! One
of the clear differences between these two types of lying in wait, killing
"by means of' or killing "while" lying in wait, has now been dissolved
completely due to the statutory amendment.397 Note that it was this dif-
ference that was first postulated in Domino as the key to the special
circumstance fulfilling the mandatory narrowing requirement of a death
penalty scheme.398
In California, the jury instructions for first degree murder by lying
in wait and the lying in wait special circumstance are now identical
except for this temporal requirement, which is now defunct, and the
requirement in the special circumstance that the defendant "intentionally
killed the victim." This "intentional murder" element is so seldom used
as to be almost meaningless. The only instance in which it might be
helpful is where the defendant laid in wait to play a practical joke on the
victim or to harm the victim in some non-lethal manner, and the victim
unexpectedly died as a result. This scenario was not present in any of
the California cases, and only mentioned in the Montana case, Fitzpat-
397. This difference in language between "while" and "by means of' was also relied upon by
the ninth circuit in keeping the two types of lying in wait distinct. See Houston v. Roe, 177 F.3d
901, 906-08 (9th Cir. 1999).
398. See Domino v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. Rptr. 486, 493 (Ct. App. 1982). Specifically, the
court noted the difference between the words "by means of," used for first degree murder lying in
wait, and "while," which was used for the special circumstance. Id. at 492. "One must assume
that the drafters were aware of the wording of Penal Code section 189 and that they deliberately
chose different words. A contrary assumption would suggest that thie drafters exercised little or no
care in establishing the criteria for deciding between life and death." Id.
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rick, although even there it was questionable. 399 The possibility that a
defendant might kill an individual by lying in wait without intending to
is so rare an occurrence that this element hardly creates a distinction
between first degree murder by lying in wait and the special
circumstance.
There is a definite distinction between the historical murder by
lying in wait, with no chance for reflection and contrition, and the
actions in Padayao,400 where the victim, although suffering through ter-
rible mental torture, was not sure whether he was going to die, and if he
did die, whether he would have a chance to reflect on his life.4 ' The
element of surprise takes on a different form if the victim is suddenly
abducted, instead of being given a split second to breathe before he is
instantly killed without any opportunity for resistance or forethought of
the afterlife. Although the difference may seem slight to victims of a
heinous crime, it is one of constitutional magnitude and should at least
be addressed before the death penalty is once again imposed in an alto-
gether arbitrary fashion.
The departure from a traditional view of lying in wait centers on the
four elements of a lying in wait murder.40 2 The first expansion was, of
course, the erasure of physical concealment in Morales.4 °3 Although
California was in line with other states that had done away with this
element, it must be noted as one step in the watering down process of
this special circumstance. 04 Is a murder with mere concealment of pur-
pose as cowardly as the lying in wait envisioned two hundred years ago?
If there is no physical concealment, is there really a difficulty, as men-
tioned above, in finding out who the murderer is? 40 5 Is a murder with
only a concealment of purpose extremely cowardly.?416
The second departure from the traditional view concerns the tempo-
ral requirement between the period of watchful waiting and the killing.
While initially spelling out a standard that the lethal acts must continu-
399. See supra note 383.
400. See supra note 230.
401. Compare Richards v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. Rptr. 120, 125 n.5 (Ct. App. 1983) with
People v. Padayao, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 13, 13-14 (Ct. App. 1994).
402. The four elements are concealment, watching and waiting, immediately thereafter a
surprise attack on the victim, and obtaining a position of advantage.
403. See People v. Morales, 770 P.2d 244, 258-59 (Cal. 1989) (quoting People v. Ward, 103
Cal. Rptr. 671, 679 (Ct. App. 1972)).
404. See id. at 272 (Mosk, J., concurring) ("I cannot agree [that] 'concealment' means anything
other than actual physical concealment .... The gist of lying in wait is that the person places
himself in a position where he is waiting and watching and concealed from the person killed.").
405. Roy MORELAND, THE LAW OF HOMICIDE 199 (1952) ("[T]he crime of killing by lying in
wait continued to remain a homicide of extreme heinousness because of its cowardly nature and
the difficulty of discovering the assassin in such cases.").
406. See id.
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ously flow from lying in wait, and that there can be no cognizable inter-
ruption between the watching and waiting and the killing, this standard
has been pushed to the breaking point.4 °7 The California Supreme Court
has never found there to be a cognizable interruption between the lying
in wait and the killing that would preclude a finding of lying in wait.40 8
This interruption, of course, may be immaterial now that the statutory
language has openly done away with the previously needed element of
murdering "while" lying in wait.4 °9
A third step in the dissolution of this death qualifying circumstance
was the decision which purported that a few minutes of lying in wait
was "substantial."410 One might imagine a scenario where the killer
conceals his purpose, has the intent to kill, and views his victim a few
hundred yards away. Since it would take a few minutes to run towards
them, that running time would constitute a substantial period of watch-
ing and waiting.4 1' Any traditional notion of lying in wait would suffer
a body blow at such a result.
The final measure, and indeed the most important, in chipping
away at the lying in wait special circumstance is the language from the
California cases that allows for the defendant to wait and maximize his
position of advantage after he is in view of the victim, but before com-
mencing his attack.4" 2 The reasoning in Hillhouse (that the defendant
found the most advantageous position of attack to be while the victim
was outside the truck urinating because there would be no blood on the
seat4 13) differs from the language in Ceja, which discusses the position
of advantage as it relates to attacking the victim.414 The California
Supreme Court shed new light on the lying in wait doctrine by
expounding the view that even if the defendant passes up an advanta-
geous opportunity over the victim-that is, one that would most take the
victim by surprise-he may wait until he obtains a more advantageous
position as it concerns the perpetration of "the perfect crime."'4 15
This explanation strays far from the heinous and horrific acts of
historic lying in wait. Indeed, the latest examples of murder that fall
under this special circumstance in California seem to be a "tragic fortu-
407. See, e.g., People v. Michaels, 49 P.3d 1032, 1050 (Cal. 2002); People v. Edelbacher, 766
P.2d 1, 24 (Cal. 1989); Morales, 770 P.2d at 261.
408. See supra note 393.
409. See supra note 236.
410. See People v. Edwards, 819 P.2d 436, 460 (Cal. 1992).
411. See id.
412. See People v. Ceja, 847 P.2d 55, 62 (Cal. 1993); People v. Hillhouse, 40 P.3d 754 (Cal.
2002).
413. See Hillhouse, 40 P.3d at 775.
414. See Ceja, 847 P.2d at 62 (emphasis added).
415. See supra note 398.
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ity ' 6 rather than a criminal mastermind who leaves absolutely no room
for the possibility of escape or self-defense. If this legal construction of
lying in wait is to continue, judges will have the final word as to what is
the most advantageous position in any crime. Surely these positions
must be endless, and prosecutors and triers of fact will have untram-
meled discretion in finding that the defendant did not give up his posi-
tion of advantage.
Two overarching themes of the California Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of the lying in wait special circumstance manifest themselves:
the court's assurance that the lying in wait special circumstance fulfills
the narrowing requirement of Furman,4 1 7 and the accompanying dis-
memberme-ut of the phrase "lying in wait," which makes that assurance
questionable.4" 8 At least four California Supreme Court Justices have
noted both the disparity in California's varied interpretation of the lying
in wait special circumstance41 9 as well as its inability to "genuinely nar-
row the class of [death eligible defendants] in a way that reasonably
justified the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant com-
pared to others found guilty of murder."420 That is, the California
Supreme Court's reliance on the consistency of the term and its contin-
ual amorphous nature remain equally strong.
As for Indiana, the IndianaSupreme Court provides an enlightening
comment on the necessary definition of lying in wait in the Davis case;
they required that there be "a sufficient connection between the conceal-
ment and the murder ... to support a finding that this murder was com-
416. See Ceja, 847 P.2d at 65 (Mosk, J., dissenting):
[Vliewed in its entirety, the evidence did not establish an underlying, and unifying,
fatal plan. Quite the contrary, it revealed a tragic fortuity. The last encounter
between defendant and the victim was similar to many that preceded it during the
course of their stormy relationship. It was different in this: Maria Ortega spit a
"nasty" remark at defendant. As a consequence, he immediately drew a gun and
pointed it at her; she ran behind a tree; and he then turned the weapon against the
victim. On such facts, a reasonable jury could not have found lying-in-waiting
beyond a reasonable doubt."
417. See, e.g., People v. Sims, 853 P.2d 992, 1008 (Cal. 1993); People v. Edelbacher, 766 P.2d
1, 24 (Cal. 1989).
418. See, e.g., Hillhouse, 40 P.3d at 783 (Kennard, J., concurring); Ceja, 847 P.2d at 63-64
(Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting); see also D.A. Cox, Annotation, Homicide: What
Constitutes "Lying In Wait"?, 89 A.L.R.2d 1140 (1963) ("[Tlhe phrase has today, as applied, a
meaning beyond the literal language and common understanding.").
419. See Hillhouse, 40 P.3d at 784-85 (Moreno, J., concurring and dissenting); Ceja, 847 P.2d
at 63-64 (Kennard, J., concurring); People v. Webster, 814 P.2d 1273, 1307 (Cal. 1991)
(Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting); People v. Morales, 770 P.2d 244, 273 (Cal. 1989)
(Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
420. See supra note 404; see also Osterman & Heidenriech, supra note 10, at 1278 ("The lying
in wait special circumstance needs to be reevaluated. Its current application in California violates
the Eighth Amendment and the mandates of the Supreme Court because it does not serve to
distinguish between the general class of murderers and those deserving death.").
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mitted by lying in wait."42 They returned to this thought in Ingle when
they found that the defendant's concealment did not constitute any part
of such lying in wait or murderous acts.422
Nevertheless, Indiana still falls prey to the same problem California
has when it creates a distinction between a non-capital lying in wait
aggravator and a capital lying in wait aggravator without explaining the
difference.423 In the first Taylor decision, the court found that the defen-
dant had lain in wait according to the definition outlined in Thacker
(which was the definition of the lying in wait death penalty aggravating
circumstance), but it also said that it did not need to resolve whether or
not his actions met that very standard since it was only aggravating his
non-capital sentence.424 Clearly, this is a patent distinction without a
difference that must be resolved if Indiana is to prove that its lying in
wait aggravating circumstance serves to meaningfully distinguish those
who are deserving of the death penalty from those who are not.
As evidenced by the paucity of cases dealing specifically with the
lying in wait aggravator in Montana and Colorado, these two states have
not assaulted or exploited the common law understanding of lying in
wait. Neither has there been a long line of constitutionally charged
arguments proposing the extinction of their lying in wait death penalty
aggravators. Notwithstanding, the presence of Justice Shea's dissent in
Fitzpatrick and the reluctance of these high courts to expound upon the
"widely understood" meaning of lying in wait remain troubling.425
Without a clear cut rendering of what this aggravating circumstance
means, courts may be free to mold the definition to their judicial prerog-
ative, and the narrowing function required by Furman will vanish.426
Overall, it is relatively clear that murder by lying in wait as applied
by the California Supreme Court has been stretched to the breaking
point. A concealment of purpose, or taking the victim by surprise, has
become the failure to immediately indicate to the victim that you intend
to kill him outright. 427 A substantial period of watching and waiting has
diminished to a few minutes.428 There appears to be no end to the inter-
pretations of what may constitute "the maximum position of advan-
421. Davis v. State, 477 N.E.2d 889, 897 (Ind. 1985).
422. See Ingle v. State, 746 N.E.2d 927, 940 (Ind. 2001).
423. See Taylor v. State, 695 N.E.2d 117, 120 (Ind. 1998).
424. See Taylor v. State, 681 N.E.2d 1105, 1111 (Ind. 1997).
425. See People v. Dunlap, 975 P.2d 723, 751 (Colo. 1999); Fitzpatrick v. State, 638 P.2d
1002, 1041 (Mont. 1981) (Shea, J., dissenting).
426. See Fitzpatrick, 638 P.2d at 1041 (Shea, J., dissenting).
427. See People v. Michaels, 49 P.3d 754, 775 (Cal. 2002).
428. See People v. Edwards, 819 P.2d 436, 460 (Cal. 1992).
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tage." '42 9  Not only can courts now fabricate the defendant's
unsuspecting plan to find the maximum position of advantage based on
circumstantial evidence, but now the advantage can relate to committing
the perfect crime instead of taking the victim unaware as it was histori-
cally understood.4 30 A cognizable interruption between the concealment
and the killing simply does not exist.43' There is an ongoing metaphysi-
cal continuum that links all concealment to all lethal attacks. It cannot
be broken. Neither physical movement nor the lapse of time can divide
the defendant's watching and waiting from his vicious acts.
V. FINAL ANALYSIS
What has been lost in the lying in wait paradigm is the completion
of the murder by the lying in wait, or, in the words of the Indiana Court,
"the connection between the concealment and the murder. '4 32 The acts
of lying in wait must result in a position of maximum advantage.433 The
Indiana Court is correct in its assumption that the watching, waiting, and
concealment must be the means by which the defendant obtains and
utilizes that position of advantage.434 Otherwise these elements have no
meaning. They would have served no purpose, and they should not be
recounted when appraising the killer's devious behavior. And if, as the
California Supreme Court has admitted, it must be the maximum posi-
tion of advantage, then courts cannot transport that advantage to an infi-
nite number of angles and positions. It must be the intended position of
429. See, e.g., People v. Hillhouse, 40 P.3d 754 (Cal. 2002); People v. Ceja, 847 P.2d 55, 62
(Cal. 1993).
430. See, e.g., Hillhouse, 40 P.3d at 754; Ceja, 847 P.2d at 62.
431. See, e.g., Michaels, 49 P.3d at 1050; People v. Edelbacher, 766 P.2d 1, 24 (Cal. 1989);
People v. Morales, 770 P.2d 244, 261 (Cal. 1989). At least one California appellate court has
found a cognizable interruption between the lying in wait and the lethal attack. In People v.
Fecht, No. B 148759, 2002 WL 1806009 (Cal. App. 2002), the defendant laid in wait, attacked the
victim, and decapitated him at some point thereafter. Id. at *3. The estimated time of death was
at least fifteen hours after the initial attack. Id. It may have been as long as twenty-two plus
hours. Id, From this evidence, the court held:
Because there was no evidence of the nature of wound inflicted during the
original attack or the cause of death, it is speculative to conclude that Klein died
slowly from the wound inflicted during the original attack. Accordingly, the
evidence was insufficient that the act or acts causing Klein's death occurred during
the period of concealment and watchful waiting or that the lethal acts commenced
and flowed continuously, without cognizable interruption, from the moment
watchful waiting and concealment ended. The special circumstance finding must
therefore be stricken and appellant must be re-sentenced.
Id. at *3-*4.
432. See Davis v. State, 477 N.E.2d 889, 897 (Ind. 1985); see also Ingle v. State, 746 N.E.2d
927, 940 (Ind. 2001).
433. See supra note 418.
434. See id.
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advantage as envisioned by the murderer. The watching, waiting, con-
cealment, and surprise attack must be parts of a coherent whole in which
the killer executes a murder by lying in wait and not in spite of it.
The fundamental idea remains a connection, a factual matrix in
which the lying in wait initiates, implements, performs, and accom-
plishes a heinous murder. It cannot be serendipitous. It cannot be fortu-
itous. Waiting too long, giving too much notice to the victim, or not
utilizing a maximum position of advantage as foreseen by the killer may
seem trivial, indeed wretched, details to gawk over in light of the vic-
tim's fate, but it is these details that warrant imposition of the death
penalty. Without these crucial elements, there is no authority for legisla-
tures and courts to send people to their graves under the banner of
Furman.4 3 5 Can one who waits and watches for a few minutes instead
of spontaneously approaching a victim fairly and honestly be rationally
narrowed out among the many categories of murderers? Can a defen-
dant who takes an unconscious man in his truck, drives him somewhere,
lets him out, and then attacks him while he is urinating be meaningfully
distinguished from someone who runs mad into a public restroom and
kills an unsuspecting victim?
Lastly, we return to Michaels.4 36 Michaels had waited outside the
victim's apartment complex for a half-hour or more until the lights went
out.4 37 Michaels and his accomplice had to walk across the parking lot,
up to the apartment, open the door, and then prepare themselves while
inside the apartment to murder JoAnn Clemons.438
Beginning with the temporal proximity requirement, Michaels
focused his appeal on the fact that there must have been a "cognizable
interruption" between the lying in wait and the murder. 439 The Califor-
nia Supreme Court disagreed: "If the only interruption was the time
required for defendant and [his accomplice] to emerge from their hiding
place, cross the apartment building's parking lot, and enter the victim's
apartment, that interruption would not preclude application of the special
circumstance of lying in wait." The court found, again, that "the vic-
tim's death would have followed in a continuous flow from the conceal-
ment and watchful waiting. 441 It should be remembered that included in
435. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 310 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("I simply conclude
that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death
under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed").
436. 49 P.3d 1032 (Cal. 2002).
437. Id. at 1041.
438. Id.
439. Id. at 1050.
440. Id.
441. Id.
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this "imaginary" temporal requirement is the mandate that there be "a
continuum of physically harmful acts from the period of concealment to
the commencement of the assault which ultimately causes death." '442
The court found no interruption in this continuum in Michaels.44 3
Michaels left his place of concealment as soon as he and his accomplice
approached the apartment. The logical conclusion is that walking across
a parking lot is physically harmful to the victim. Walking up stairs is
physically harmful to the victim. Entering an apartment is physically
harmful to the victim. Fumbling for a murder weapon must also be part
of the continuum and therefore physically harmful to the victim. Can
this logic withstand constitutional scrutiny under Furman?444
A more legitimate reading of the events shows that the period dur-
ing which Michaels and his accomplice scouted the apartment and
waited for their ride to return was interrupted in both time and physical
space from the attack. The killing did not involve an "ambush or some
other secret design" as the special circumstance contemplates. There
was a clear interruption separating the period of lying in wait from the
actual attack during which Michaels and his accomplice discussed the
getaway with their cohort, waited for the area to be clear of people, and
crossed to the apartment. There is simply no transcending the fact that
there was a concrete set of actions that vividly separated the period of
concealment from the commencement of the lethal acts.
Did Michaels display a concealment of purpose? He and his
accomplice walked across the parking lot; this was in plain view of any-
one within the observational radius. They walked upstairs; presumably
people do not break into houses in the middle of the night for any other
reason except to commit burglary or other nefarious acts. If the victim
had walked out her bedroom, or seen him at all, Michaels's purpose
would have been immediately known. This is a far cry from the histori-
cal instances of lying in wait that were extremely cowardly or clandes-
tine. It is likely that the half-hour period spent watching and waiting
was a "substantial" amount of time, and therefore this element was prob-
ably satisfied.
What of obtaining a maximum position of advantage through the
use of lying in wait? Although this case involved hiding, the conceal-
ment did not create a position of advantage from which the attack was
mounted. Michaels's period of lying in wait did not result in a vantage
442. See People v. Morales, 770 P.2d 244, 261 (Cal. 1989).
443. Michaels, 49 P.3d at 1050.
444. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 256-57 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("[T]hese
discretionary statutes are unconstitutional in their operation. They are pregnant with
discrimination and discrimination is an ingredient not compatible with the idea of equal protection
of the laws that is implicit in the ban on 'cruel and unusual' punishments.").
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point from which he could launch an ambush. By the time Michaels
entered the victim's bedroom, no part of her surprise could be attributed
to his emergence from that initial concealment. Even if the lookout
position from across the street could be characterized as a position of
advantage, this advantage was surrendered as soon as they left their
place in the bushes, and it did not consummate the surprise lethal attack.
Lying in wait used to be feared because of "the cowardly nature of
the offense and the difficulty in identifying the assassin. ' '44  These con
cerns have long passed in the modern interpretations given to the lying
in wait special circumstance. The sparse discussion of lying in wait by
446 ~1 hother states, as well as the fact that only four states use it as an aggra-
vating circumstance," 7 should ring the bell for those analyzing Califor-
nia's widespread use of it in sending defendants to death row. Without
caution, California has set itself apart in applying this special circum-
stance to a vast number of situations, and it is abundantly clear that it
has failed to mete out those deserving death in a non-arbitrary and non-
discriminatory fashion. 44 8 The Domino court was the first to try to pro-
vide a meaningful distinction between first degree murder and the lying
in wait special circumstance in California. It surmised: "A contrary
assumption would suggest that the drafters exercised little or no care in
establishing the criteria for deciding between life and death. '44 9 This
suggestion was true, but it is now a reality, and it is a deadly reality to
those pleading for their lives before the California Supreme Court. The
lying in wait special circumstance has been prostituted on every side and
through each element. It no longer fulfills the narrowing requirement of
Furman, and it is therefore a shameless attempt to circumvent constitu-
tional safeguards against the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty.45 °
Lying in wait, if it is to be used as an element of a crime that
warrants execution, must be reexamined, rewritten, and reapplied to
faithfully adhere to the fundamental fabric of our death penalty jurispru-
dence. Should these efforts be ignored, the ghosts of Furman will be
445. See MORELAND supra note 76, at 199.
446. Illinois state courts have used the phrase "lying in wait" twenty-six times since 1878.
New York state courts have used the phrase thirty-two times since 1805. Texas state courts, while
mentioning lying in wait in 114 cases going back to 1853, has only discussed the phrase eleven
times since 1950. These figures are striking in contrast to California. California state courts have
used the phrase "lying in wait" 368 times, and 272 of those are after 1950. Even more disturbing,
they have discussed the lying in wait special circumstance ninety-eight times since 1981!
Statistics taken from www.lawschool.westlaw.com.
447. See supra note 36.
448. See Osterman & Heidenriech, supra note 10, at 1278.
449. Domino v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. Rptr. 486, 492 (Ct. App. 1982).
450. See id.
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lying in wait, preparing to tear down the sanctity of criminal justice, and
ready to launch a lethal attack on every defendant's constitutional
liberties.
